





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BISMARCK
AND
GERMAN UNITY



BISMARCK

AND

GERMAN UNITY

BY

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SECOND EDITION
REVISED AND ENLARGED

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PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION

THIS sketch of Prince Bismarck's career was published, immediately after his death, in the New York *Evening Post* and (in part) in *The Nation*. It is reprinted with little change and with few additions. It would have been easy to expand the sketch into a portly volume, — easier, indeed, than it was originally to keep it within its present limits, — but it is believed that such a summary as is here offered will be useful to those who are too busy to read many thick books, and to those who wish a more sharply outlined impression than is readily obtained from a mass of details. It will be most useful, however, if it awakens or increases its readers' interest in an important historical movement, dominated and directed by a remarkable personality, and if it sends some of them to fuller histories and biographies.

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, September, 1898.

PREFACE

TO THE SECOND EDITION

SINCE 1898, when this book was first printed, more exact information concerning many episodes in Bismarck's life has become accessible; but nothing has been published which necessitates a different view of the main lines of his career or an altered judgment of his achievements. In the present edition, accordingly, the author has been content to reprint, in the main, the original text, although, for the sake of accuracy or of clearness, some verbal changes have been made and a few paragraphs have been remodelled.

Several pages, however, have been added, in order to note and characterize the more important books (including Bismarck's posthumous memoirs) which have appeared during the past twelve years.

There is also added, in revised form, an essay on "Bismarck as a Phrase-Maker," which originally appeared in *The Bookman*, and which may here serve to humanize the portrait of the statesman by bringing into clearer view some of his more personal traits and, in particular, his humor.

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From the beginning of my career I have had but the one guiding star: By what means and in what way can I bring Germany to unity? and in so far as this end has been attained: How can I strengthen this unity and increase it and give it such form that it shall be enduringly maintained with the free consent of all coöperating forces? — BISMARCK IN THE GERMAN IMPERIAL DIET, JULY 9, 1879

BISMARCK

AND

GERMAN UNITY

OTTO EDWARD LEOPOLD VON BISMARCK Birthplace
was born at Schönhausen in the Old
Mark of Brandenburg, province of Sax-
ony, kingdom of Prussia, April 1, 1815.
He came of a line of country gentle- Paternal
men, whose main business was always ancestry
the care of their estates in the Mark
and in Pomerania, but who incidentally,
like most Brandenburg gentlemen, served
their princes in war and sometimes as
diplomatists or administrative officials.
The record of the family runs back to
the thirteenth century, and the estate
of Schönhausen has been in its posses-
sion for more than three hundred years.
On the mother's side Bismarck came Maternal
of plainer people, but among these also ancestry
were servants of the state. His maternal

grandfather, Mencken, entered the Prussian civil service under Frederick the Great and, as chief of the cabinet of Frederick William III, proposed some of the reforms which Stein afterwards effected.

Social
position

The country gentlemen of Prussia held, in Bismarck's youth, a position not unlike that of the landed gentry of England. They were the governing class and managed the affairs of their districts; and the country squire who developed an exceptional talent for administration passed easily and naturally from the government of his neighborhood to the administration of the province or of the

Education

kingdom. By way of preparation for these duties and possibilities, the future landholder sometimes studied law and even entered the judicial or administrative service of the state, without necessarily intending to become either an advocate or a professional official. In accordance with this excellent usage, the young Bismarck, at the age of seventeen, was matriculated in the law faculty at

Göttingen and spent three semesters as a student in that university — but, if Göttingen traditions are to be trusted, can not be said to have studied there. At Berlin, however, where he completed his law course, he must have studied; for he passed the state examination with credit and entered the state service. It was his hope to qualify for a diplomatic career; but one year in the Berlin city court and parts of three years in administrative work at Aix and at Potsdam changed his views; and, at the age of twenty-four, he assumed with his brother Bernhard the care of his father's Pomeranian estates. For eight years the future chancellor of the German empire devoted himself to sheep-raising and grain-growing, relieving the monotony of his life by hard riding and occasional hard drinking, but also by hard reading and travel. In 1845 he became a member of the Pomeranian Diet. The death of his father, in the same year, gave him the ancestral seat

Life in the
country
1839-47

Entry into
public life

of Schönhausen in the province of Saxony. Here he was made superintendent of dikes; and here also he was chosen, not to membership, indeed, but to a first alternacy in the Diet. He had gained the confidence of his fellow squires; and when, in 1847, Frederick William IV attempted to solve the parliamentary problem by collecting at Berlin the members of the eight provincial Diets, a vacancy in the representation of the "Saxon knighthood" gave Bismarck seat and voice in the first session of the United Diet.

German poli-
tics, 1815-48

It was an uneasy time in Prussia and in Germany when the United Diet came together, and it was soon to be a stormy time. The German people were dominated by two aspirations, popular sovereignty and national unity. That these objects were not merely distinct but also, under the conditions then existing, incompatible, the people wholly failed to realize. The two ideas had gained their

hold upon the German mind in the same historic period—that of the first French revolution and the revolutionary wars (1789–1815). The revolution had infected the Germans with the democratic fever, and the subjugation and humiliation of Germany by Napoleon had awakened a specific German patriotism and shown the necessity of national union. In the war of liberation (1813) the German governments, and notably the government of Prussia, had appealed to both of these popular ideas. They had promised the people liberty and unity. When the victory was won, when Napoleon was dethroned and France reduced to its pre-revolutionary boundaries, the German governments broke their pledges. Germany was organized, at the Congress of Vienna (1815), into a loose confederation of sovereign states; and in the majority of these states, including Prussia and Austria, the princes retained absolute power. The people naturally lost all faith in their rulers and began to look

to a popular uprising and the establishment of popular sovereignty as the only means of national unification. This connection of ideas determined the creed of both parties. As the nationalists were nearly all Liberals, and to a great extent Democrats, so, by an inevitable antithesis, nearly all the Conservatives were particularists, identifying the maintenance of princely power with the system of state sovereignty and German disunity. All agitation in favor of national unity was punished as treason.

Revolution of
March, 1848

The paralysis of princely government in 1848 gave the Liberals an unexpected opportunity to attempt the realization of their programme: unity through liberty. The Paris insurrection and the dethronement of Louis Philippe kindled the flame of revolution throughout Germany; and everywhere, at first, the German revolutionists achieved complete success. All the German princes who had thus far retained absolute power gave or promised constitutions; and those who had already

given constitutions appointed Liberal ministers and promised Liberal reforms. Prussia and Austria succumbed to the popular movement as completely as the little states; and Austria, the bulwark of conservatism, was threatened with destruction by simultaneous insurrections in Hungary and Italy. Constitutional liberty seemed assured, and the Liberal leaders had for the moment a free field for their attempt to secure national unity. A German parliament, elected by universal suffrage, met at Frankfort and addressed itself to the task of framing a national constitution for a new German empire.

Popular
unity
movement

Frankfort
Parliament

It was characteristic of the *doctrinaire* spirit of the movement that the central and vital point of the whole question was the last to be considered. There were in Germany two great states, either of which was stronger than all the little states together; and the prime question was: Which of these two states, Prussia or Austria, shall have the hegemony in

Austria,
or
Prussia?

the new Germany? But as neither of these states would peacefully submit to the rule of the other, the question immediately restated itself: Which of these two states is to be excluded from the new Germany? The answer could not be doubtful. Prussia was the more modern and progressive of the two states, and in the customs union it had brought all the German states except Austria into commercial unity. The Parliament finally excluded Austria from the empire, and offered the imperial crown to Frederick William IV of Prussia. But this result was not attained until the spring of 1849. In 1848, when all the petty princes were terrorized by the revolution and the Austrian empire was struggling for existence, the scheme might conceivably have been realized. In 1849 the reaction had begun: the princes had largely recovered their courage and reëstablished their power, and Austria had fought through the worst of its embarrassments. In 1849, there-

Leadership
offered to
Prussia

fore, the offer of the imperial crown to Frederick William IV was simply an invitation to him to mobilize his army and fight for it. The success of such a venture was doubtful; and from the Conservative point of view the stake was not worth the risk. The Liberals in the Frankfort Parliament had gained the adhesion of the Democrats and secured a majority only by making the constitution of the new empire so democratic that the emperor would have been a mere figurehead. Frederick William of Prussia accordingly refused the imperial crown, and the revolutionary experiment was at an end. The Liberal programme had failed, as in the nature of things it was bound to fail. No confederation has ever been rebuilt into a nation without the cement of blood.

Prussian
refusal

For Prussia, however, the recognition of its necessary hegemony by the representatives of the German people had a certain moral value—a value all the greater because the recognition was

Princely
movement
for unity
1849-50

Erfurt
Parliament

Olmütz

tardy and reluctant. The Prussian government endeavored to utilize this advantage in 1849 and 1850 by negotiations with the North German princes. A treaty of alliance was concluded with Saxony and Hanover for a "restricted union"; nearly all the lesser states accepted the proposal; and a second constituent Parliament met at Erfurt in the spring of 1850. But the adhesion of Saxony and Hanover was not even half-hearted; there was no heart or sincerity in it. These states were simply temporizing with Prussia. They were really averse to the proposed union and were engaged in simultaneous negotiations with Austria. For a brief space, in 1850, Prussia and Austria seemed likely to come to blows and the German question to a solution. But Russia threw its whole influence and threatened to throw its whole force on the side of Austria; and Prussia, in the convention of Olmütz, November 29, 1850, yielded every point in dispute. The old confederation was

reëstablished in all its old impotence, and the Federal Diet resumed its sessions at Frankfort.

What was Bismarck's position on all these questions? Towards the constitutional movement in Prussia his attitude was one of bitter and uncompromising hostility. In the United Diet of 1847-48 he figured as a Tory of the Tories. He was more royalist than the king, and opposed every diminution of the kingly prerogatives. When in the spring of 1848 the king promised a constitution and the United Diet passed an address of thanks, Bismarck was one of the few who voted against the address. He accepted the situation, he declared, because he could not help it; but he was not willing to close his activity in the Diet with the lying assertion that he was thankful for what he was obliged to regard as a mistake. When the king summoned a representative assembly to frame the promised constitution, Bis-

Bismarck's
Toryism

marck refused to stand for election. When the king dissolved this assembly, published a constitution of his own and ordered new elections, Bismarck accepted a mandate as deputy in the new Diet; but this he did only on the personal solicitation of the king.

Attitude
toward
the unity
movements

Toward the popular unity movement his attitude was that of an unfriendly critic. He approved the king's refusal of the imperial title offered by the Frankfort Parliament, because the Frankfort constitution would make the emperor "the vassal" of the Radicals. "The Frankfort crown," Bismarck said, "may be very brilliant; but the gold which gives truth to its brilliancy is to be gotten by putting the Prussian crown into the melting pot." Bismarck sat in the Erfurt Parliament, but he saw clearly the hopelessness of its attempts and occupied himself in throwing cold water upon the enthusiasts. During the Austro-Prussian disputes of 1850 he voted with the Austrophils in the Prussian

Diet, and defended the convention of Olmütz.

When the German confederation was reëstablished, Frederick William IV sent Bismarck to the Frankfort Diet as the representative of Prussia. This appointment elicited hostile comment. The Frankfort Diet was nothing but a standing congress of ambassadors and the appointment of a man without diplomatic training was a breach of Prussian traditions. Upon the Prussian representative at Frankfort, moreover, rested in large measure the defence of Prussia's German interests, and the appointment of a pronounced friend of Austria seemed likely to result in a sacrifice of these interests. Bismarck undoubtedly owed his appointment to his legitimist, or rather absolutist, attitude in Prussian politics. His defence of the royal prerogative had won him the confidence of the king. His attitude towards Austria made his appointment particularly suitable. After Olmütz, it

Envoy at
Frankfort
1851-59

would have been absurd for Prussia to send to Frankfort an ambassador who was not *persona grata* to Austria.

Bismarck's appointment was no error. His attitude towards Austria resulted in no sacrifice of Prussia's interests. His support of Austria during his parliamentary career had been dictated by party feeling. The Conservatives rightly regarded Austria as the bulwark of conservatism, and Bismarck was a thorough Conservative. At Frankfort, however, he ceased to be a Conservative and became simply a Prussian. He found the Austrian influence in the ascendant and saw that this influence was constantly used to thwart Prussia's plans and injure Prussia's prospects. Before he had been in Frankfort a year, the adroitness and the persistence with which he countered the Austrian schemes made him *persona ingrata* at Vienna, and repeated efforts were made in the following years to secure his recall.

For this period of Bismarck's career we possess fuller data than for any other,

Change of
views

because the greater part of his Frankfort correspondence, including not merely official despatches but private letters to the Prussian prime minister, has been given to the public. These despatches and letters are of such literary excellence as to make them one of the monuments of classical German prose; of such intrinsic value that no history of the period can be written without consulting them; and they show such breadth of view and keenness of insight as fully to explain the advancement of the writer to the highest position in the Prussian state. The business actually transacted in the Frankfort Diet was petty and unimportant to the last degree; but Frankfort was a central point of European intrigue, and the most vital questions of European politics were touched in Bismarck's despatches. The king and his minister-president, Manteuffel, consulted their representative at Frankfort upon all leading questions of state policy; and his advice seems commonly to have been followed.

The Frank-
fort corre-
spondence

This was notably the case during the Crimean war, when France, England and Austria sought to draw Prussia into an attitude of hostility to Russia, and Bismarck convincingly maintained the absence of any Prussian interest in the war and the impolicy of aiding Austria. His Frankfort experiences had caused him to believe that, in the existing condition of European and German affairs, Austria was Prussia's natural enemy. He wrote in 1856:



In every century since the time of Charles V, German dualism has settled its relations by an internal war, fought to the finish; and in the present century also there will be no other way of setting the clock of our development at the right hour. . . . I desire to express my conviction that at no distant time we shall have to fight with Austria for our existence.

And in 1859, just after the outbreak of the Italian war, he wrote that the embarrassments of Austria gave Prussia an exceptional opportunity to readjust its relations to Germany; that these relations

amounted, for Prussia, to a disease; and that this disease, unless radically cured at some such favorable moment, would have to be treated, sooner or later, *ferro et igni*. Here is already the line of thought which led to the war of 1866 and the formation of the North German confederation; and here is also, in its first form, the famous phrase *Eisen und Blut*.

In the following year, alluding to rumors of his own leanings toward a French alliance, he wrote to a friend: "If I have sold myself, it is to a Teutonic and not to a Gallic devil"; and in another letter he declared that he could not see why Prussia should shrink so coyly from the idea of a representative German parliament.

A German
policy

The letters last cited were written from St. Petersburg. Bismarck's hostility to Austria had become so pronounced that the Prussian government, not yet prepared to accept his policy, had deemed it advisable to promote him out of Frankfurt and, as he himself expressed it, to

Ambassador
to Russia
1859-62

“put him on ice” on the Neva. Here he remained as Prussian ambassador for three years.

William I
(1861-88)

Reform
of the army

Opposition
of the Diet

During the latter part of Bismarck's term of service at Frankfort, King Frederick William IV had been attacked by a disease of the brain, and in 1858 his brother, Prince William, had assumed the regency. In 1861 Frederick William died, and the prince regent became king. One of the chief causes of Prussia's disgraceful submission at Olmütz was the imperfect condition of its army; and King William, a soldier before all things, was resolved upon a thorough reorganization of “the instrument.” The plan involved a serious increase of the budget, and this the Chamber of Deputies refused. Foreseeing an obstinate conflict, the king wavered for a time between two courses: abdication or the enforcement of the royal will in spite of the Deputies. If he chose the latter course, he needed as premier a man completely devoted to prerogative,

resolute in action and fearless of consequences; and there was no man among his subjects who possessed these qualities in a higher degree than his ambassador at St. Petersburg. The minister of war, von Roon, whom the king liked and trusted above all his advisers and who was a friend of Bismarck, was persistent in urging Bismarck's appointment. Early in 1862 Bismarck was recalled from Russia, apparently with a view to his becoming prime minister; but the king could not yet make up his mind and Bismarck was sent to Paris. In the autumn of the same year von Roon telegraphed: "*Periculum in mora*"; and Bismarck returned to Berlin and was appointed president of the Prussian ministry.

Bismarck
ambassador
to France

Minister-
president

William's
distrust
of Bismarck

Contemporary letters and memoirs published in the last few years have made it clear that at this time (1862) King William neither liked Bismarck nor fully trusted him. The dislike was caused, in part, by Bismarck's extreme frankness and frequent brusqueness of speech; the

distrust was not of Bismarck's ability or loyalty but of his discretion. Under both sentiments lay, as Erich Marcks has shrewdly suggested, the natural antipathy which common sense feels toward genius.

Bismarck's
management
of William

Bismarck was called to the premiership because he undertook to secure the reorganization of the army in spite of the Deputies, and because he convinced the king that this could be done without violating the constitution. It was not William's intention to abandon the personal direction of Prussia's general policy. In fact, however, it was Bismarck's will and not the king's that determined Prussian action from 1862 to 1866 and German action from 1867 to 1888. This result was not reached without friction nor without occasional crises. William possessed too strong a character to accept, without resistance, plans that he only partially comprehended and ventures of which he could not foresee the outcome. He was also,

with all his ambition, too conscientious a man to do what he thought wrong. Bismarck, however, had a remarkable power of lucid statement and of coercive reasoning; and when persuasion failed, he did not hesitate to break the king's resistance by the irresistible logic of events. In many cases William doubtless failed to see that the situation which constrained him had been deliberately created by his minister. There can be little question that in 1866 he as firmly believed Austria to be the aggressor as he believed France to be the aggressor in 1870. To Bismarck, William's reluctances were often troublesome; but they had for Prussia a value which Bismarck did not fail to recognize: they minimized the impression of unscrupulousness which the minister's policy was too apt to create.

During the first four years of Bismarck's administration, Prussia's internal politics were extremely simple although

Parliamentary conflict
1862-66

very stormy. Each year the Deputies refused to vote the increased military appropriations. Each year the Diet was dissolved and new elections ordered. Each new election increased the anti-governmental majority. But the people, even when the agitation was hottest, continued to pay their taxes; and the upper house, which was completely under the control of the government, voted the desired appropriations. The money was then spent by the government without authorization from the Deputies, and the army was reorganized according to the plans of the king and his minister of war.

Foreign
policy
1862-66

Prussia's foreign policy during these years, on the other hand, seems very intricate and somewhat tortuous; and as far as the details are concerned it was necessarily so. Bismarck had assumed the direction of Prussia's affairs with the intention of solving the German question by establishing the hegemony of Prussia. This could be done only after a suc-

cessful war with Austria. To assure Austria Prussia's triumph, Austria must remain isolated, and to that end Prussia must maintain cordial relations with France and Russia. So far, all was clear and simple; but the method by which these ends were to be attained could not be determined in advance: it depended necessarily upon the course of events. Bismarck had devoted his three years in St. Russia Petersburg to cementing the friendly relations already existing between Russia and Prussia and had obtained assurance that Russia would not interfere again, as in 1850, in behalf of Austria. During his brief mission in France he seems to have convinced himself that Napoleon III would also remain neutral. As president of the ministry, one of his earliest acts was to conclude a liberal commercial treaty with France; and the insurrection of 1863 in Russian Poland enabled him to render useful aid to the Russian government. The re-opening of the Schleswig-Holstein question, in the same year,

touched Germany more nearly; and this question, as Bismarck handled it, led directly to the solution of the German problem.

Schleswig-
Holstein
question

The Schleswig-Holstein question, although a complicated one, is not so unintelligible as is commonly supposed. These two German duchies had long been united with Denmark; but they were not parts of Denmark, for the union was purely personal: it resulted from the fact that their dukes had become kings of Denmark. The Danes naturally desired to make the union a real one. In the way of their ambition stood the facts that Holstein belonged to the German confederation and that old treaties guaranteed that Schleswig and Holstein should never be separated. Hence the incorporation of Schleswig was impossible without the simultaneous incorporation of Holstein, and the incorporation of Holstein was impossible without the assent of Germany—an assent which the Danes could not

hope to obtain. This complicated state of things had already caused much trouble. In the revolutionary year of 1848 the Schleswig-Holsteiners had risen against the Danes and attempted to establish their independence, and Germany had actively supported the movement. But when the German revolution was suppressed, the Schleswig-Holstein revolution shared its fate. The revolt of the duchies was regarded by the Conservatives generally, and by the governments of Austria and Prussia in particular, simply as an insurrection against constituted princely authority; and both Prussia and Austria aided in the restoration of the duchies to their lawful sovereign. The whole question of their relation to Denmark, present and future, was discussed in London in 1852, and an attempt was made to settle it by a European treaty. It was then already foreseen that the union with Denmark, established by a dynastic accident, was likely to be severed in the same way. The main line of the ruling dynasty was

Revolt of
the duchies
1848

London
conference
1852

dying out; and the succession to the Danish throne was certain to pass, sooner or later, to the Glücksburg branch of the family. But this branch derived title through the female line, and the succession in Schleswig-Holstein was governed by the Salic law. Schleswig-Holstein accordingly would pass, not to the Glücksburg, but to the younger Augustenburg line. The London conference undertook to change all this. It decreed that Schleswig-Holstein should be permanently associated with Denmark, and that the succession, both in Denmark and in the duchies, should be vested in the Glücksburg heirs. This treaty or protocol of May 8, 1852, was signed by Prussia and Austria as European powers; but it was not ratified by the German confederation nor in any way accepted by the Schleswig-Holsteiners. And the Prussian and Austrian ambassadors signed the London protocol only after, and in consideration of, a previous treaty with Denmark, by which that

London
protocol
1852

kingdom bound itself to respect the autonomy of the Schleswig-Holsteiners and not to incorporate Schleswig.

Such was the position of affairs when King Frederick VII. of Denmark issued a decree (the patent of March 30, 1863) which separated Schleswig from Holstein and practically incorporated the former in the kingdom of Denmark. The German powers at once protested; and the Federal Diet, in October, ordered an "execution" in Holstein, *i. e.* voted to send troops there. On November 14 a new Danish parliament, representing Denmark and Schleswig, voted a new constitution incorporating Schleswig. On the following day Frederick VII died. His successor, Christian IX, signed the new constitution. Frederick's death complicated the question of the special rights of Schleswig with the broader question of the succession in both duchies. By the London protocol Christian IX became duke of Schleswig-Holstein as well as king of Denmark. But the

Danish
aggression
1863

Death of the
Danish king

Dispute
over the
succession

German confederation, as we have seen, had never agreed to this, nor had the Schleswig-Holsteiners. In their opinion Christian of Glücksburg had no rights in the duchies; and when, in December, the federal execution was carried into effect by an army of 12,000 Saxons and Hanoverians, Frederick of Augustenburg was acclaimed as duke, and took up his residence at Kiel.

Prussia's
choice of
courses in
1863

The popular
course

To the Prussian government two courses were open. It could recognize the London protocol as still in force and compel Christian IX, as duke of Schleswig-Holstein, to observe the preliminary treaty which guaranteed Schleswig's autonomy; or it could declare the London protocol abrogated, recognize Frederick of Augustenburg as duke and help him to gain possession of Schleswig. The public sentiment of Prussia, as of the other German states, was strongly in favor of the latter course. By adopting it Bismarck would at once have become the popular leader

of a national movement, but he would have imperilled the real interests not only of Prussia but also of Germany. The revolutionary character of the popular programme and the violation of treaties which it required would have aroused the opposition of Europe. Prussia and the German patriots would have stood alone together, as in 1850; and, if successful against such odds, they would simply have added a new petty sovereignty to a Germany cursed already with over-many sovereignties. If, on the other hand, the Prussian government should accept the situation created by the treaties of 1852, it could indeed demand that Schleswig be not incorporated in Denmark, but if this point should be conceded, Prussia would be obliged to restore both duchies to their Danish ruler. This was what Austria desired and the German patriots dreaded. Bismarck, however, had satisfied himself that the party in power at Copenhagen would accept war rather than give up the incorporation of Schleswig; and

The
unpopular
course

Bismarck's
decision

war once declared, he foresaw that the prize of victory would be whatever the victor chose to make it. The Prussian cabinet accordingly announced that it recognized the treaties of 1852 as binding, and that it demanded from Denmark nothing but the observance of those treaties — a declaration in which Austria gladly joined. The storm of protest which this action aroused in the Prussian Diet and throughout Germany was used by Bismarck to secure Austria's support in decisive measures against Denmark, and to avert the intervention of the other European powers. "If you do not support the moderate measures which we deem necessary," Bismarck said to Austria, — "If you oppose the just and temperate course which we are pursuing," he declared to the other powers, — "my colleagues and I will retire from the ministry. The king will then be forced to summon into power the leaders of the German revolutionary party." For fear of worse things Austria went hand in hand with

Prussia, and Europe looked on inactive. The Danes, as Bismarck expected, refused to abrogate their new constitution, and war was declared. In February, 1864, an army of 60,000 Austrians and Prussians invaded Schleswig, and on April 18 the Prussians stormed the redoubts of Düppel. A week later representatives of the European powers met in London, agreed upon an armistice and endeavored to negotiate a treaty of peace. The negotiations were fruitless. The Danes still refused to reëstablish the personal union and demanded the annexation of a portion at least of Schleswig. The war was renewed, the allies were victorious, and by the treaty of Vienna, October 30, 1864, Denmark ceded Schleswig-Holstein and the little duchy of ~~Lauenburg~~ to Prussia and Austria.

War with
Denmark
1864

This *condominium* or joint sovereignty of Prussia and Austria in the duchies was precisely what Bismarck desired. Believing that war with Austria was

Condominium
in Schleswig-
Holstein
1864-66

necessary for the solution of the German question, it seemed to him convenient to have a cause of war always ready; and such a relation as that now established in the duchies would necessarily be fruitful of causes for war. Further, whenever the war should come, these duchies would be for Prussia an extremely desirable addition to the stake in play. They represented a possible gain for Prussia, but no possible gain for Austria. Their position would make their annexation to Prussia both feasible and natural, while Austria could in no case dream of annexing them. From this point of view, Bismarck's diplomacy was especially skilful, and the association of Austria in the enterprise was its most masterly feature. Bismarck himself declared, after the French war, that the Schleswig-Holstein campaign was the one of which, from a political point of view, he was proudest.

How Austria's play was forced

It has often been asked, in the light of subsequent events, why Austria joined forces with Prussia. It is difficult to see

how Austria could have acted otherwise. If Bismarck had repudiated the London treaties, then indeed Austria's course would have been clear. It could have put itself at the head of a European concert for the restraint and punishment of the Prussian law-breakers. Bismarck, however, assumed an attitude of unimpeachable legality, which was also in consonance with the Austro-Prussian policy of 1850; and Austria was compelled either to act with Prussia or not to act at all. Austrian neutrality, however, would have left Prussia in complete control of the field. Prussia would have made war alone; would have annexed the duchies at its close; would have gained greatly in power and enormously in prestige. This Austria could not tolerate; and unless it were prepared, as Bismarck had already suggested, to "transfer its centre of gravity to Ofen," it had to go with Prussia in order to see that Prussia did not go too far. It cannot be maintained that Austria was duped; for when, at

an early stage of the joint action, the Austrian cabinet attempted to stipulate that the duchies should be restored to Denmark unless both powers agreed upon some other disposition, Bismarck refused his assent and substituted a stipulation, which the Austrian ministry accepted, that the eventual disposition of the duchies should be determined by agreement between the two contracting powers.

Strained
relations with
Austria

The joint ownership of the duchies speedily led, as Bismarck had anticipated, to dissension. Austria was willing to turn them over to Prussia in return for compensation in Silesia. King William, however, refused to cede any portion of Silesia. Austria then espoused the cause of the Augustenburg prince. Prussia protested, and war seemed imminent in 1865. It was postponed, not so much by Bismarck's will as by the king's, and a temporary adjustment was reached in the convention of Gastein. By this treaty Prussia bought out Austria's rights in

Convention
of Gastein
1865

Lauenburg, and the administration of government in the two other duchies was divided, Prussia assuming control of Schleswig and Austria of Holstein. But the truce was a short one. Prussia accused Austria of encouraging the Augustenburg agitation, and when, on June 1, 1866, Austria submitted the Schleswig-Holstein question to the Federal Diet, Prussia declared the treaty of Gastein broken and the joint administration of the duchies reëstablished. Prussian troops were accordingly sent into Holstein. Austria pronounced this a breach of the peace; and on June 11 the Austrian representative in the Federal Diet proposed the mobilization against Prussia of the contingents of all the other German states. This motion was carried, June 14, by a three-fifths vote. The Prussian representative declared, in the name of his government, that this attempt to levy federal war upon a member of the confederation was a breach of the fundamental pact of union, and that the con-

New
dissensions

federation was thereby dissolved. He added that it was the purpose of his government to find for the unity of the German people a form better suited to the conditions of the age.

The German
question

For nearly three months, in accordance with a plan foreshadowed in his earlier letters, Bismarck had been pushing the German question to the front. He had been agitating, by circulars to all the German governments, the question of federal reform, and on April 9 he had caused a proposal to be introduced in the Federal Diet for the establishment of a German parliament on the basis of manhood suffrage. Immediately after the vote of June 14, Prussia called upon the governments of Saxony, Hanover and Hesse-Cassel to join in the establishment of a new federal union. Upon their refusal Prussian troops invaded these territories, and the war for the control of Germany began on June 16, 1866.

The war with
Austria, 1866

Neither Austria nor Prussia stood alone. Austria was supported by all the South

German states, *viz.* Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden and Hesse-Darmstadt, and by the more important states of North Germany, *viz.* Hanover, Saxony, Hesse-Cassel and Nassau. Prussia had secured the alliance of Italy by a secret treaty (April 8). In case of victory Italy was to receive Venice. The war was practically terminated by the great Prussian victory of Königgrätz or Sadowa, July 3. After Sadowa, Prussia was in a position to dictate the terms of peace. The military men wished to enter Vienna and to demand a strip of Bohemian territory. Bismarck feared a joint intervention of the neutral powers and desired a speedy settlement. He also urged the impolicy of inflicting lasting wounds upon Austria's national pride; and after a hard struggle he carried his point. Preliminaries of peace were signed at Nicolsburg, July 26, and the final treaty at Prague, August 23. Italy received Venice; Austria conveyed to Prussia its interests in Schleswig-Holstein and recognized the dissolution

Sadowa

Peace of
Prague

of the old German confederation and the creation of a new North German confederation, to be composed of the states north of the Main. North of the Main, also, Prussia was to annex such territories as it saw fit, promising to spare Saxony. The South German states were to be permitted to form an independent confederation of their own. Austria was for ever excluded from Germany.

Napoleon's
interference

To these arrangements Napoleon III was in fact though not ostensibly a party. It was French influence, backed by the prospect of French intervention, that secured the recognition of South German independence. In consideration of the abandonment—or rather postponement—of Prussian hegemony over South Germany, Napoleon assented to more extensive Prussian annexations in North Germany than were at first proposed.

Prussian an-
nexations

Prussia annexed Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau and the free city of Frankfort, adding four and a half millions to its population and in-

creasing its territory by a fourth. The annexation of Hanover was especially advantageous; it rounded out what Motley had described as "Prussia's wasp-waist."

All the rest of the German states north of the Main, including the kingdom of Saxony, ten duchies, seven principalities, and the free cities of Hamburg, Lübeck and Bremen, joined with Prussia in the formation of a new federal union — the North German confederation. Its constitution was draughted by Bismarck, accepted by the governments of the single states, and submitted in 1867 to an Imperial Diet chosen by manhood suffrage.² After this Diet had passed it with a number of amendments, it was ratified without further amendment by the legislatures of the single states. Under its provisions the executive powers of the union were vested in a president (the king of Prussia) and a Federal Council consisting of appointed representatives of the different states. In this council Prussia was to have seventeen votes, Saxony



The North
German con-
federation

four, the larger duchies and principalities each three or two, and the smaller principalities and the free cities each one. The presidency of the council was entrusted to a chancellor, appointed by the federal president. (Bismarck, of course, became chancellor.) The legislative power was vested in the Federal Council and an Imperial Diet elected by manhood suffrage. In name federal, the new union was essentially national. Its power extended over military and naval matters; over commerce, railways, telegraphs and the post; over the entire field of judicial organization, criminal law and procedure, civil procedure and commercial law. The change from the old confederation (1815-1866) to this new union was greater than the change from the American articles of confederation to the American constitution of 1789.



Character
of the new
union.

In the light of these splendid achievements, the public judgment of Bismarck underwent an immediate and complete

reversal. A few of his opponents had been converted to his support by the outcome of the Danish campaign, but until the autumn of 1866 he was generally regarded as a reactionary, pure and simple. His conflict with the Prussian Chamber of Deputies had naturally intensified this impression. In his support of the army reform, in his hostility to the insurgent Poles, in his treatment of the Schleswig-Holstein question, he had defiantly antagonized German public opinion; and when it became evident that his conduct of Prussian policy was certain to produce war with Austria, he was the best hated and the best denounced man in Germany. On May 7, 1886, he narrowly escaped death at the hands of a fanatic named Cohen. The assassin killed himself in prison. Crowds of people visited the cell, and women covered Cohen's body with flowers and crowns of laurel.

Bismarck's
unpopularity
1862-66

Attempt on
his life

The revulsion of feeling which followed the Austrian war, and the sudden popularity of its author, were not due solely,

Reversal of
sentiment

Bill of in-
demnity

Shifting of
party lines

nor even chiefly, to the vulgar admiration of success. Bismarck had realized the deepest desire of the German people. He had made Germany a nation, with a legislature resting on the broadest and most popular basis. He also made peace with the Prussian Chamber of Deputies. To the dismay of his Tory supporters, and not without a struggle with his royal master, he asked and received indemnity for governing without a budget, thus recognizing the rights of the Chamber and the abnormal character of his own administration during the period of conflict. The natural result was a complete disorganization of the parliamentary opposition and a general shifting of party lines. The best elements of the opposition, the Old Liberals of 1848, formed a new National Liberal group, which during the next ten years generally acted in concert with the government and, with the Conservatives, gave it a working majority both in the Prussian Diet and in the Imperial Parliament.

This simplified the internal politics of Prussia and of the confederation; but the foreign relations of the new union were far from satisfactory. Napoleon, as we have seen, had thus far shown himself friendly to Prussia. He had intimated, in 1865, his willingness to conclude an offensive alliance against Austria (Prussia to reorganize Germany and France to receive payment on the left bank of the Rhine); and in spite of the rejection of this offer he had actively furthered the conclusion of the alliance between Prussia and Italy. He did not believe that Prussia was a match for Austria; he believed that his aid would still be needed, and that he would ultimately get his price. Sadowa defeated these schemes; and after Sadowa he should have seen that nothing was to be gained by negotiation. He could not or would not see this, and at once began to demand compensation for his neutrality. At Nicolsburg, in July, 1866, his ambassador, M. Benedetti, demanded a rectification of France's east-

Strained
relations with
France


Compen-
sations
demanded

ern frontier. On August 5 the French demands were put into definite form. Prussia was to grant France the frontier of 1814, and was to obtain from Bavaria and from Hesse-Darmstadt the cession of their provinces on the left bank of the Rhine. Luxemburg was to be separated from Germany and the Prussian garrison was to be withdrawn from the fortress.¹ Bismarck promptly declared that the cession of German territory could not be considered. On August 20 Benedetti declared that France would be satisfied with Saarlouis, Landau and Luxemburg; but if Prussia would help France to acquire

¹ Luxemburg belonged, at this time, to the king of the Netherlands. It had formed part of the old German confederation. The fortress of Luxemburg was a federal fortress, and the Prussian garrison was stationed there in accordance with federal treaty. With the dissolution of the old confederation, Luxemburg was already practically separated from Germany, and the reason for keeping a Prussian garrison in the fortress had disappeared. Napoleon desired that Prussia should recognize these facts and inferences, in order that the way might be clear for his acquiring Luxemburg from the king of the Netherlands.

Belgium, France would permit Prussia to incorporate South Germany in the German confederation. On August 29, Benedetti put this latter suggestion into the form of a draught treaty in his own handwriting. It has never been shown that Bismarck agreed to any of these demands; but he undoubtedly permitted the French ambassador to hope that some compensation would be conceded. "Au moins," as Sorel neatly says, "il y avait eu dialogue"; and it is inconceivable that Benedetti should have gone so far without considerable encouragement. Bismarck has himself admitted that he pursued a "dilatory" policy. His object was twofold. He desired to postpone the inevitable war with France until the Prussian military system was introduced in the annexed provinces and in the other German states; and he desired documentary evidence of the French demands. This, as we have seen, he obtained; and of the documents thus obtained he made very effective use. During the peace negotiations between

Evidence of
French
demands
secured



Use made of
the evidence

Prussia and Bavaria in August, 1866, Bavaria appealed to Napoleon for his good offices, which Napoleon promptly granted. Bismarck met this move by exhibiting to the Bavarian minister the draught treaty of August 5, showing him that his friend the emperor of the French had asked Prussia for large portions of Bavarian and Hessian territory. The result of this revelation was the immediate conclusion, not merely of a treaty of peace, but also of a secret treaty of offensive and defensive alliance between Prussia and Bavaria (August 22). Similar treaties had already been concluded with Würtemberg and Baden. Equally effective use was made of the draught treaty concerning Belgium. It was published in the London *Times* of July 25, 1870, a few days after the French declaration of war. The effect of this disclosure upon the public opinion of England and of Europe was all that Bismarck could desire.

The prime cause of the Franco-German war was the irritation felt by the French people at the growth of a first-class power on their eastern frontier. A long step had been taken in 1866 towards German unity, and the completion of this movement, it was felt, would threaten the traditional primacy of France in Europe. A secondary cause was the failure of the French government to obtain territorial compensation for the increased power of Prussia. After the unsuccessful negotiations described above, Napoleon attempted in 1867 to carry out a part at least of his programme by purchasing Luxemburg from the king of the Netherlands. This attempt created great indignation among the people of Germany; and the military party at Berlin, believing that a contest with France was inevitable, wished to precipitate the war before the French army reforms, then under discussion, were completed. Bismarck, however, declared that "the personal conviction of a ruler or statesman, however well

Genesis
of the
Franco-Ger-
man war

Luxemburg
incident
1867

founded, that war will eventually break out, cannot justify its promotion." He contrived to defeat the purchase of Luxemburg without giving the French government any tangible grievance against Prussia. But Napoleon felt that he had again been duped, and the incident increased the tension between the two nations. A large body of Napoleon's warmest supporters began to agitate for war against Prussia as the only means of rehabilitating the prestige of the dynasty. Negotiations were opened by Napoleon with the emperor of Austria and the king of Italy for joint action against Prussia; and although, because of the failure of the three courts to reach any satisfactory agreement on the Roman question, no formal treaty was signed, an understanding was attained early in June, 1870, that if France declared war upon Prussia and succeeded in occupying South Germany, then Austria and Italy, having gained time for mobilization by a temporary neutrality, would also declare war

Coalition
against
Germany

and add their forces to those of France. War, it appears, was not contemplated before 1871, for the Austrian military authorities stipulated that the declaration of war by France should be made not later than in April.

The immediate occasion of the war was the Spanish candidacy of Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern. This prince, although a Hohenzollern, was not a member of the Prussian royal house but of the South German and Catholic house of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. He was more closely connected with the imperial family of France than with the royal family of Prussia. By family compact, however, the king of Prussia was recognized as the head of the house. The Spanish ministry, in search of a Catholic king, had repeatedly offered to present Leopold's name to the Cortes—twice in 1869 and again in March, 1870—but the offer had been declined. King William advised against the acceptance of the candidacy, and in 1869 Bismarck was of

The Spanish
candidacy

Bismarck's
part in the
affair

the same mind. In 1870, however, Bismarck advised acceptance. His change of opinion, he said, was due to the fact that the Spanish revolutionary government, unstable in 1869, had obtained in 1870 the complete control of the country. When the third offer had been declined, Bismarck secured, through Prussian agents, a fourth offer; and in June, 1870, largely in consequence of his advice, Leopold consented to become a candidate. King William was informed of the prince's decision and declared that he could interpose no objection. Although these negotiations were conducted quietly, they were not kept secret from Napoleon. In the interest of his dynasty, the emperor would probably have preferred Leopold to the Orleanist duke de Montpensier, who was, in 1870, the only other prominent candidate; but he had informed Benedetti, and Benedetti had probably informed Bismarck, that the French people would not tolerate a Hohenzollern candidacy. German writ-

ers assert, however, that Bismarck did not expect serious opposition from Napoleon; and, as a further proof of his pacific intentions, they point out that he had kept open a line of retreat. This latter assertion is true. Bismarck had caused the question to be dealt with from the outset as one that in no wise concerned the Prussian state, and that concerned the king only as titular head of the Sigmaringen branch of the family. From this point of view, Leopold's acceptance concerned only himself and Spain; and the same would be true of his withdrawal. It would in no wise compromise the dignity or lessen the prestige of Prussia. The other assertion, however, that Bismarck expected no serious opposition on Napoleon's part, is far from plausible. The facts indicate that Bismarck promoted the candidacy with full knowledge that opposition would be encountered, and expected at the same time that his candidate would withdraw when the opposition became manifest.

Bismarck's
motives

What were his motives? In the present state of our information, only a conjectural answer is possible. If we assume that Bismarck was aware of the arrangements that were making for an attack on Germany in 1871, we can see why he should desire to provoke a declaration of war in 1870 before those arrangements were perfected. He would naturally desire, further, that France should declare war under such circumstances that European public opinion would condemn its action. Prince Leopold's candidacy would not give France a very good *casus belli*; and if by any chance France should declare war after Prince Leopold's withdrawal, the situation, from the German point of view, would be ideal. It is perhaps improbable that Bismarck's calculations had been pushed to this point in the spring of 1870; but he must have foreseen that Prince Leopold's acceptance and withdrawal would place Napoleon and his ministers in a difficult position—a position in which it

would be easy to blunder; and we know that he had little respect for Napoleon's capacity and still less for that of de Gramont, the new French minister of foreign affairs. He had long before described Napoleon as *une grande incapacité méconnue*, and he had declared that Gramont was the greatest blockhead (*Dummkopf*) in Europe.

When, early in July, the news of the prince's acceptance reached Paris by way of Madrid, great indignation was manifested in the French journals and by the French government. Gramont declared the candidacy an attempt "to reëstablish the empire of Charles V." A protest sent to Berlin elicited from an under-secretary (Bismarck was in Varzin) the information that Prussia had nothing to do with the candidacy. Benedetti was then instructed to proceed to Ems, where King William was taking the waters, and to ask the king to obtain from Prince Leopold a withdrawal of his acceptance. The king answered that he had no right

Leopold's
acceptance

French
demand

William's
attitude

to address such a demand to the prince; but he told Benedetti that if the prince saw fit to withdraw he would approve the withdrawal. On July 12 the French government received notice, again from

Leopold's
withdrawal

Madrid, that Prince Leopold's acceptance had been withdrawn. This was regarded throughout Europe as the end of the incident. It was felt that the French government had carried its point and that there would be no war. Napoleon and his prime minister, Ollivier, expressed themselves in this sense. Bismarck, who had reached Berlin and had intended to proceed at once to Ems, decided to stay in Berlin. But Gramont, supported in this by the general feeling of Paris and of the Deputies, declared that the satisfaction obtained by France was inadequate.

New French
demands

He suggested to Werther, the Prussian ambassador, that King William should write an explanatory letter to the emperor; and, with Napoleon's assent, he instructed Benedetti to obtain from the king an assurance that the candidacy

would not be renewed. On the morning of July 13 the king was asked to give such a pledge, and refused. He told Benedetti that this demand indicated to him a determination on the part of the French government to force a war. In the French cabinet, on the evening of the 13th, it was not felt that the king's refusal made war necessary. Energetic remonstrances from the representatives of friendly powers had convinced Napoleon and his ministers that they had gone too far, and their feeling was in favor of accepting the situation. On the 14th, in consequence of action taken by Bismarck the day before, they decided upon war; and on the 15th war was declared.

France
disposed to
retreat

On the morning of the 13th, as soon as he heard of the new French demands of the 12th, Bismarck for the first time took an overt part in the controversy. He explained to the English ambassador that France was obviously determined on war, and that it was now Prussia's turn to demand explanations and assurances. He

Bismarck
intervenes

notified Werther that his conduct in entertaining the demand for "a letter of apology" was disapproved, and directed him to take leave of absence on account of ill health. On the evening of the same day he received a telegraphic account of the occurrences of the morning at Ems, closing with the suggestion, on the part of the king, that the new French demand and its refusal be made public. This suggestion Bismarck carried out in the most literal fashion, omitting all details. The account thus given to the public created the impression that the negotiations in Ems had terminated more abruptly than was really the case. The Germans thought that King William had been insulted,—which was true, as regarded the substance of the French demand, but untrue as regarded the form of its presentation,—and the smouldering indignation that had been kindled by the arrogant tone of the French orators and of the French press burst into a flame of wrath. The Parisians thought that their ambas-

"Editing"
the Ems
despatch

Effect of
Bismarck's
action

sador had been insulted, and demanded an immediate declaration of war. Napoleon and his ministers knew that Benedetti's dismissal had been courteous; but they saw that peace could be preserved only by an obvious and unmistakable retreat, on their part, from the ill-considered position which they had taken on July 12. Bismarck had so utilized their mistake as to hold them to its consequences.

The way in which the French ministers handled the Hohenzollern candidacy shows that they regarded it, at the outset, as a favorable issue on which to force a war. If France should declare war on a distinctly German question, all Germany, they foresaw, would side with Prussia, and it would be difficult for Austria to intervene. By selecting a question which concerned only the Prussian dynasty they hoped to secure the neutrality of the South German states and the active assistance of Austria. When, after being deprived of their original grievance, they

French
expectations

Attitude of
South
Germany

nevertheless declared war, they undoubtedly hoped that the French troops would secure, without serious opposition, the control of South Germany before the North German mobilization was completed, and that Austria and Italy, in spite of the lateness of the season, would come to their aid. These hopes proved futile. In South Germany, as in the North, the war was regarded as an attack on German independence, and the South German states at once placed their armies at the disposal of the king of Prussia. The North German troops were concentrated on the Alsacian frontier with unexpected rapidity, while the French mobilization proved far slower than was anticipated. From the start France was thrown on the defensive. Partly for this reason, partly because held in check by Russia, Austria remained neutral. The king of Italy, in spite of the dissent of his ministers, desired to come to Napoleon's aid; but the success of the Prussian arms was too rapid

and complete to encourage interference. Seven weeks after the declaration of war the entire force with which Napoleon took the field was destroyed, captured or shut up in besieged fortresses. After Sedan the issue of the struggle was certain; but the heroic obstinacy of the French people prolonged the war for six months. Preliminaries of peace were signed at Versailles, February 26, and the final treaty at Frankfort, May 10, 1871. France ceded to Germany Alsace, including Strasburg, and part of Lorraine, including Metz,—about 1,500,000 souls,—and agreed to pay a war indemnity of 5,000,000,000 francs.

German
victories

Peace of
Frankfort



The most important result of this war was the completion of German unity. In South Germany local patriotism and religious prejudice had heretofore stood in the way of union with Prussia. These obstacles were swept away in the enthusiasm of this national war. In the march from the Rhine to the Seine, Bavarians,

The German
empire

Württembergers, Hessians and Prussians felt themselves, as never before, one great people. The diplomatists had only to put the stamp of law upon the accomplished fact. In November, treaties of union were concluded between the North German confederation and the South German states; and on January 18, in the hall of mirrors in Versailles, King William was proclaimed German emperor. The prophecy of Frederick William IV had come true—that the imperial crown would be won on the field of battle.

The new empire, with its twenty-five states and its one territory (Alsace-Lorraine), embraced, at its establishment, over 40,000,000 people, a number which rose in the three following decades, by natural increase and in spite of emigration, to more than 55,000,000. Its constitution is simply a revised edition of the North German constitution of 1867. The position of the South German states, barring a few reserved rights, is identical with

that of the North German states. Their governments are represented in the Federal Council and their people in the Imperial Diet.

In this parliament Bismarck never found—nor in the light of his experience with the Prussian Diet could he have hoped to create—a passive instrument of his or the emperor's will. The parliament and the people behind it have always had and have constantly asserted an independent will of their own. But the people and the parliament of the new empire have not at any time offered any such blind and obstinate resistance to the realization of vital national interests as did the Prussian deputies before 1866. The internal politics of the empire have been full of conflict; but every conflict has been fought out within the lines of the constitution, and settled by some compromise which has preserved at once the interests of the state and the liberties of the citizen.

The German
parliament
1871-90

The Centrists

The most powerful and the most troublesome element of opposition was the Ultramontane or Centre party, which had sixty-three votes in the first parliament of the empire (1871-74), and after 1874 regularly numbered about one hundred—a little more than a fourth of the entire membership. It was ostensibly established to defend the liberties of the Roman Catholic church in Germany; but it was established at a time when no measure menacing those liberties had been passed or even proposed. It really represented, in the first place, the hostility of the Roman curia to the establishment in central Europe of a powerful empire with a Protestant head; and it embodied, in the second place, a great deal of the local disaffection due to the annexations of 1866. Its leader, Windthorst, was formerly a minister of the king of Hanover; and the malcontent “Guelfs” and other “Particularists” acted and voted as its allies. The outspoken disloyalty of some of its mem-

bers and the systematic agitation of the Jesuits and of a portion of the Roman Catholic clergy induced the imperial and state governments, first, to adopt repressive measures, and finally to attempt by law a more exact definition of the limits of religious liberty. Thus arose the so-called "culture conflict." Bismarck always objected to this phrase, insisting on the essentially political character of the struggle and declaring that, as minister-president and chancellor, he was not fighting for culture but for the political interests of the Prussian state and the German empire. In the main the conflict was fought out in Prussia and the other single states, religious affairs not falling within the imperial jurisdiction. The resistance of the Catholic clergy to the new laws—particularly to the Prussian "May laws" of 1873—was very bitter and obstinate. In Prussia nearly all the Catholic bishops were imprisoned or expelled; and an alarming number of parishes were deprived of all

"Culture
conflict"

The May
laws, 1873

spiritual care. The Prussian government soon found itself obliged to ask the Diet for large powers of indulgence and dispensation: in other words, for power to execute the laws or leave them unexecuted at its discretion. The death of Pius IX, January 7, 1878, and the election of a less combative and more politic successor, Leo XIII, facilitated the attainment of a *modus vivendi*; and the disruption of the National Liberal party in 1879 and the resultant disappearance of the governmental majority caused Bismarck to desire a truce. He needed Centrist support; and he secured it on the *do ut des* plan, sacrificing the anti-clerical legislation bit by bit in return for votes for governmental measures. A peace — or rather an indefinite truce — was concluded with the Roman curia in 1887. Prussia had already “revised” the greater portion of its church laws out of existence, and the Pope agreed that the government should be notified of all intended appointments to ecclesiastical

Close of the
conflict, 1887

offices. But, notwithstanding this arrangement, the Centre maintained its organization and its attitude of general opposition, and Bismarck continued to traffic with its leaders whenever its support was necessary. At the time of his dismissal the governmental reserve of possible concessions was not yet exhausted; there was still enough anti-clerical legislation on the statute-books to carry his successor through one rather difficult legislative period.

The uses of
adversity

During this struggle with the church, Bismarck a second time narrowly escaped assassination. On July 13, 1874, while driving in an open carriage, he was shot at by a cooper named Kullmann. At the moment the shot was fired Bismarck had touched his hat in answer to the salutation of an acquaintance, and the ball passed between his temple and wrist. Kullmann assigned the wrongs of the church as the reason for his act.

Second
attempt on
Bismarck's
life, 1874

The Social
Democrats

Much less powerful in parliament, but far more dangerous to the social and political order of the German empire, is the Social Democratic party. The great strength of this party in Germany—in the election of 1890 it cast nearly eleven per cent of the total vote¹—is partly due to the idealistic character of the German mind, but mainly to the sudden passage of the German people from a system of economic restraint to an almost perfect economic liberty. This change was accomplished by a series of liberal laws enacted by the North German and Imperial Diets, abolishing nearly all restrictions upon trade and industry and giving the laborer full freedom, but exposing him also to the unchecked influence of free competition. All such transitions are of course accompanied by much suffering and discontent; and the discontent of the German

¹ In 1898 the Social Democrats cast nearly 28 per cent of the total vote and carried about one-seventh of the seats in the Imperial Diet.

workingmen found expression in the Social Democratic movement. The rapid growth of the party, and the increasingly revolutionary tendency shown in the speeches and writings of its leaders, had already caused the imperial and state governments to consider the desirability of repressive legislation, when, on May 11, 1878, a workingman named Hödel, who was shown to be connected with the Social Democrats, attempted the life of the emperor. Bismarck at once introduced in the Imperial Diet an anti-socialist bill of great severity, intended to suppress entirely the spread of Social Democratic doctrines. To the majority of the Deputies the bill seemed too great an invasion of the freedom of assembly and of the press, and its passage in the form desired by the government was refused. On June 2, a second attempt was made upon the emperor's life by a man of university education, Dr. Nobiling. The emperor was seriously injured, and for a

Repressive
legislation

Reform
legislation

time his life was thought to be in danger. Bismarck promptly dissolved the parliament and ordered new elections. The electors supported the government, and the new parliament passed the desired measures against the socialists. The law was passed for a term of years only, but was repeatedly reënacted and remained in force until 1890. Bismarck, however, was not satisfied with repressive measures. He believed it necessary to strike at the root of the trouble, not, as many Conservatives desired, by abandoning the principles of economic liberty, but by bettering the position of the workingmen. In accordance with this desire, and largely through his influence, rigid employers' liability laws were adopted, and also a remarkable series of statutes organizing a system of compulsory insurance of laborers against accident, disease and old age.

The German
army

During these years of conflict with the Ultramontanes and with the Social

Democrats, Bismarck was occupied with questions even more vital to the new empire—questions that touched the central points of political power, the army and the treasury. It was the Prussian army that had made Germany a nation, and the maintenance of German unity was felt to depend upon the strength and efficiency of the federal army. The constitution of the empire provides that every adult German shall be held to military service, but leaves the details of army organization to be regulated by law. The Conservatives desired that this should be done by an ordinary law, not limited as to duration; while the Radicals were disposed to demand an annual regulation. As against the Radical demand, the military authorities insisted that so complex a machine as the German army could not be run from year to year with annual risk of parliamentary interference. Bismarck himself did not desire a permanent law, because such a law, he thought, would make any future

The sep-
tennate

increase of the army difficult. His attitude facilitated a compromise, *viz.* the periodical passage of laws fixing the strength of the peace footing for a term of years. From the outset, the term selected was seven years; and at the close of each septennate the strength of the army has been increased. In 1887 the Diet attempted to shorten the period to three years. Bismarck declared this an attempt to make the federal army "a parliamentary army," dissolved the Diet, January 14, 1887, and appealed to the country. The country supported the government, returning a Diet in which the Radical faction lost two-thirds of its strength; and the new parliament voted a new septennate with a peace footing of nearly half a million. In 1888 it extended the time of service in the *Landwehr*, increasing the fighting strength of the army by 700,000 men, and enabling Germany, as Bismarck said in a notable speech on February 8, 1886, to put a million men on each frontier — the western and the eastern.

During the first years of the new empire the imperial treasury derived its income largely from contributions levied upon the single states. The constitution assigned to the empire all customs duties, but under the existing tariff these duties were quite insufficient to balance the imperial budget. The constitution also gave the empire wide powers of indirect taxation, and Bismarck resolved to utilize this source of supply. For such taxation, the most available objects were spirits and tobacco. An excise upon spirits would have encountered the opposition of the Conservative landholders, who are large producers of brandy; and no measure of financial reform could be carried without the aid of the Conservatives. Bismarck accordingly turned to tobacco, and demanded either a monopoly or a heavy taxation of the manufacture. The monopoly was his choice. He claimed that the tobacco monopoly would not merely place the empire in a position of financial independence, but

German
finances

Project of a
tobacco
monopoly

Defeat of the
project

would give it a surplus to be divided among the single states. The states would thus be enabled to reduce greatly their direct taxes. This project, however, found no favor in the eyes of the German Liberals. The manufacture of tobacco was one of the most prosperous of Germany's industries, and one of the least concentrated. It was carried on in thousands of little factories, and often as a house industry. Accordingly, the National Liberals, who represented especially the middle class, opposed the monopoly. For a time the leaders of this party seemed inclined to support some scheme for taxing the manufacture of tobacco; but the opposition of their constituents ultimately forced them into opposition on this point also. Without the support of the National Liberals the proposed taxes could not be carried; for the Conservative and National Liberal parties constituted the majority upon which the government had thus far depended. No feasible way of increas-

ing the imperial receipts was now left except an increase of the customs duties. This involved the abandonment of the policy which the German customs union had pursued from the outset, and to which the empire had thus far remained constant. But Germany was ready for a change. The theory of free trade had been strongly assailed. Numerous industries were clamoring for protection, and to secure a protective tariff it was necessary only to bring a sufficient number of industrial interests into combination. Such a tariff was passed July 12, 1879, by a combination of the land and the iron interests. The duties imposed on breadstuffs and cattle held the Conservatives firm in their allegiance to the government, and the duties on iron won the support of the Ultramontanes, this party being strongly recruited from the mining and manufacturing districts on the Rhine. The National Liberal party was temporarily disrupted. Incidentally, it is almost needless to say, this tariff

A protective
tariff, 1879

greatly increased the revenue of the empire; and after its adoption it was found to be possible to balance the imperial budget without collecting contributions from the states. Subsequently the financial independence of the empire was further assured by a tax upon spirits, voted by the strongly governmental Diet of 1887.

Colonial
policy

During the debates upon the tariff of 1879 Bismarck urged that the protection of German industries would increase not only the wealth of Germany but its population also, and thus doubly strengthen the country. Emigration, he argued, was due to lack of employment, and the growth of manufactures would increase the demand for labor and enable more Germans to live in Germany. But the chancellor did not expect these results from the simple imposition of protective duties. The output of the German factories could not permanently be increased without an increase of the for-

eign demand. New channels must be opened to German trade and new markets conquered for German industry. Much had been done already by the private enterprise of German merchants; much more could be done if their efforts were seconded by the diplomacy and supported by the power of the imperial government. The first step in the development of Bismarck's far-reaching plans was the sudden seizure in 1884 of a number of points upon the coasts of Africa and the islands of the Pacific ocean. The second step was to break down the exorbitant African claims of Portugal, and to open the Congo to the commerce of the world. This was done at the Berlin conference of 1884-85. A further measure contemplated by the chancellor was the creation by imperial subsidies of German steamship lines which should give the German manufacturers and merchants rapid and direct communication with the principal ports of Africa, Australia and Asia. This scheme aroused

The Berlin
conference
1884-85

strong opposition in the German parliament, and Bismarck, after repeatedly renewing his demands, obtained only a portion of the desired subsidies.

General
results

If we consider simply the extent to which his direct ends were realized, Bismarck's conduct of the internal politics of the empire seems a mixture of success and failure. But if we consider the degree to which his ultimate purpose was achieved, and in what measure the central power was strengthened and the new national union consolidated, his administration, in its net result, seems altogether successful. When he withdrew from office, he left the empire strong in arms, independent in its finances, and exercising an undisputed sovereignty in legislation and administration.

Foreign
relations of
the empire
1871-90

The chancellor's conduct of German diplomacy during the early years of the empire is generally recognized as altogether masterly and successful. In this

domain, even the most obstinate opponents of his internal administration conceded his supremacy. In its main lines, his foreign policy was extremely simple. Its object was to avert war. Germany had obtained what she desired. She belonged to the satisfied nations. She had nothing to gain by further victories and much to lose by defeat. The chief menace to her peace came, of course, from France. It was impossible for the French people to abandon the hope of reconquering their lost provinces. But they were not likely, as things stood, to declare war without some strengthening alliance. It was therefore the task of the German chancellor to keep France isolated. For this purpose he considered it desirable that France should remain a republic. The establishment of a monarchic government in France would, he believed, make it easier for that country to obtain allies. The attempt of the German ambassador at Paris, Count von Arnim, to carry out an opposite policy and aid the



France

Royalists, was the beginning of the quarrel between the two men which ended in Arnim's ruin.

Russia

A more direct means of preserving the peace of Europe was to hold and strengthen Germany's friendships. It was especially important to retain, if possible, the good will of Russia. The friendly attitude assumed by the Russian emperor in 1866 and 1870 had greatly facilitated the unification of Germany. But Russia's friendship was a precarious possession. It rested in part upon the insecure basis of dynastic sympathy, and in part upon a lively expectation of services to be rendered by Germany. It proved difficult for Bismarck to satisfy this expectation. In 1870 Germany helped Russia to set aside the treaty of Paris (1856) and reassert her supremacy in the Black sea; during the Turco-Russian war, in 1877 and 1878, Germany observed a friendly neutrality; and at the Congress of Berlin Bismarck, as "the honest broker," endeavored to mediate fairly between Russia

on the one hand and Austria and England on the other, and to save for Russia some of the fruits of her victories. But his support seemed to the Russians insincere. The ill success of the Russian diplomacy was laid at his door; and the relations between the two empires became strained and unfriendly. Bismarck at once opened negotiations with Austria, and in 1879 a treaty of alliance was concluded. This treaty was published in February, 1888. It established a defensive alliance for the maintenance of the peace of Europe. It was directed, of course, against the two powers from whom a disturbance of the peace was most to be feared — France and Russia. In 1882, Italy, irritated by the French occupation of Tunis, joined the German-Austrian alliance. Russia apparently deemed it inadvisable to make head against this combination, and externally friendly relations were reëstablished between the courts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. Bismarck, on his part, while holding fast to

German-
Austrian al-
liance, 1879

The triple
alliance, 1882

Secret
treaty with
Russia, 1884

the Austrian alliance, made every effort to avoid a breach with Russia. From 1884 to 1890 the peace of Europe was "reinsured" by a secret treaty between Germany and Russia, in which each power pledged itself to remain neutral in case the other should be attacked by a third power. It appears that the terms of this treaty were unofficially communicated to the governments of Austria and Italy, but that, at the desire of Russia, its very existence was kept secret from France and the other powers. From 1884 to 1890, Germany supported Russia's diplomacy in the Balkan peninsula, and Austria acted in concert with Germany.

Bismarck
and the old
emperor

Bismarck's relations with William I had long been satisfactory. The distrust with which the king at first contemplated the rapid resolutions and apparently rash actions of his minister had long since disappeared: no distrust could survive successes so brilliant and

so continuous. If in the long run William realized that it was not he but his chancellor who was shaping history, his mind was too just to harbor resentment and his nature too noble for jealousy. In course of time, as Marcks asserts and as we may well believe, William's confidence and gratitude ripened into sincere affection. After the establishment of the empire no court intrigues, however strongly supported, were able seriously to shake Bismarck's position. The alliance between the government and the Liberals after 1866 entailed many results which the emperor did not like; but he accepted them. The treaty of alliance with Austria in 1879 seriously distressed him, because it seemed to destroy all prospect of cordial relations with Russia; but he accepted that, too. This was the last important conflict; during the remaining eight years of William's reign we hear of no more friction between the emperor and his chancellor.

The death of William I and the brief

Frederick
III, March
9-June 15,
1888


reign of Frederick III wrought no change in the position or power of the chancellor. The humane and idealistic Frederick had little sympathy with Bismarck's rough and often cynical realism, but he showed no disposition to discharge a minister who had rendered such services to the dynasty and the nation. Bismarck had equally little sympathy with such a character as Frederick's; but he stood ready to serve the son as loyally as he had served the father. Frederick's posthumous diary exhibits in the strongest light this antagonism of temperaments, and his own incapacity to understand Bismarck; but it also shows us how completely the stronger will, when it chose to make the effort, dominated the weaker. Had Frederick ascended the throne in full health of body and vigor of mind, the struggle for power which showed itself in his reign might have assumed larger proportions and a more acute character; but it would still have been a struggle, not be-

tween the king and his minister, but between the minister and other wills striving to impose themselves upon the king.

Whatever peril of a breach existed was thought to be removed when William II became emperor. The new ruler was but twenty-nine years old; he had grown up during the triumphs of Bismarck's diplomacy; it was understood that he shared, or reflected, Bismarck's views. But it soon became clear that the young emperor had ideas and a will of his own, and was not inclined to be guided by an all-powerful premier. To an energetic disposition he added the conviction of a personal responsibility to be discharged by personal attention to all governmental affairs. The question soon arose whether Bismarck, as president of the Prussian ministry, was to continue to exercise the powers of a premier as he understood them, or whether the monarch, to use Bismarck's expression, was "himself to act as minister-president." A Prussian ordinance of nearly forty

William II
1888

Ministerial
vs. imperial
responsibility



Ordinance
of 1852

years' standing required that all communication between the king and his ministers should pass through the president of the ministry. During the long reign of William I this ordinance had been so fully observed, in the letter and in the spirit, that the minister-president alone was directly responsible to the king; the other ministers were practically responsible to the premier. In the winter of 1889-90 Bismarck became aware that certain members of the Prussian ministry were working against him, and he promptly demanded that the ordinance of 1852 be enforced. This demand the emperor met with a proposal that the ordinance in question should be revoked. To this proposal Bismarck refused his ministerial consent. The emperor apparently acquiesced in this decision; but he demanded shortly afterwards that Bismarck should keep him informed of all negotiations with members of parliament. This Bismarck refused to promise; and after an angry

discussion on March 17, 1890, the emperor demanded Bismarck's resignation. The immediate cause of this quarrel was an interview between Bismarck and Windthorst, in which, according to Bismarck's friends, Windthorst offered the chancellor the support of the Centre against the emperor,—an offer which the chancellor declined to consider,—while, according to the story that reached the emperor's ears, it was Bismarck who was seeking such an alliance against his imperial master. Bismarck at first refused to resign and demanded an open dismissal; but in response to a second demand he tendered his resignation, which was immediately accepted. A few days later the ex-chancellor left Berlin amid great demonstrations of popular affection and regret. In 1866 Bismarck was upheld by the king alone against almost universal hatred and distrust. He had now lost the support of the crown, but he had won the confidence and the love of the German people.

Windthorst
interview

Bismarck's
enforced
resignation
March 20
1890

The quarrel
with the
emperor

The quarrel between the ex-chancellor and the emperor soon became open and bitter. In inspired editorials and personal interviews Bismarck subjected the policy pursued by his successor, General Caprivi, to detailed and often scathing criticism. It was notorious, however, that William had now become his own premier and that the measures fathered by Caprivi were really William's; and the emperor retorted with circular notes to the foreign powers, explaining that no weight was to be attached to Bismarck's utterances. There appeared also semi-official threats of prosecution for libel or for treason, which were wisely left unrealized. All that the emperor could do, in fact, was to place Bismarck under a social ban, as far as court functions and public ceremonies were concerned, to request foreign courts to withhold from him and his family all social recognition, and to withdraw from Bismarck's friends and admirers all governmental favors and privileges.

To the great relief of the German people, this unseemly contest was ended by a public and formal reconciliation. A severe illness by which the prince was attacked in the summer of 1893 facilitated overtures on the part of the emperor. They were cordially received; and in January, 1894, amid demonstrations of lively popular satisfaction, the dismissed servant and his imperial master exchanged visits at Berlin and Friedrichsruh, with much of the state and ceremony which surrounds the intercourse of potentates of equal rank. In the following year the emperor figured prominently in the celebration of Bismarck's eightieth birthday. An imperial visit to Friedrichsruh opened a series of demonstrations which were protracted for a fortnight, and which were compressed within that period only by the orders of Bismarck's physicians. Representative delegations came from all parts of the empire; addresses and gifts poured in, not only from Germany and the German

A formal reconciliation

Bismarck's
eightieth
birthday

colonies, but from every considerable body of German-speaking residents in foreign lands. The only discordant note in this national festival was the refusal of the Imperial Diet, controlled by Bismarck's old antagonists, Ultramontanes, Particularists, Radicals and Social Democrats, to pass a formal vote of congratulation; but this refusal evoked so general an outburst of popular indignation that the incident helped to emphasize the reverence and affection of the German people for their great statesman.

Death

The closing years of Bismarck's life were passed in domestic retirement, although to the very end he maintained a close watch upon the course of contemporary politics and occasionally expressed his views through the columns of the *Hamburger Nachrichten*. He died July 30, 1898, leaving instructions that he be interred without pomp upon his estate at Friedrichsruh, and that upon his tomb be inscribed: "A faithful German servant of Emperor William I."

Before his retirement from power, Bismarck had received, both from the king whom he made emperor and from the people whom he made into a nation, many substantial tokens of appreciation and gratitude. After the conclusion of the Gastein convention William I conferred upon him the title of count, and when the German empire was established that of prince. The king also gave him the estate of Friedrichsruh in Lauenburg. In 1866, when the government proposed to the Prussian Diet the bestowal of dotations upon Moltke, Roon and other generals, the Diet, of its own motion, placed Bismarck's name at the head of the list, and voted him the largest sum — 400,000 thalers (\$288,000). In 1871, in connection with a similar series of dotations, the Imperial Diet voted him 750,000 thalers (\$540,000). In 1885, when the prince completed his seventieth year, the sum of 2,379,143.94 marks (nearly \$571,000) was raised by popular subscription. The committee which received the sub-

scription expended 1,150,000 marks in the redemption of a part of the estate of Schönhausen, sold by the prince's father. The letter of presentation declared it a fitting thing that Germany, to which the prince had restored so much of its lost territory, should restore to the prince the lands held by his ancestors. The remainder of the fund was converted, at the prince's desire, into a perpetual foundation for the support of candidates for appointment in the higher institutions of learning and for the relief of the widows of teachers in such institutions. In 1890, in accepting Bismarck's resignation, William II conferred upon him the title of duke of Lauenburg and advanced him to high military rank. The emperor also offered him, as a pension, the continuance of his official salary; but this offer was rejected.

Personal
characteris-
tics

Bismarck was a man of great stature — six feet and two inches, English measure — and of athletic frame. In his youth and

early manhood he was an excellent fencer, a powerful swimmer and a tireless rider; and at the age of fifty-five he bore the exposure and fatigue of the winter campaign in France not merely without injury but with positive benefit to his health. In later years his increasing weight unfitted him for physical exertion; but his capacity for protracted mental labor, always phenomenal, was unimpaired at the close of his public career.

He possessed strong social instincts and great social talents. The perception of the characteristic in men and in things, the faculty of sketching in words, the frequent wit and the constant caustic humor which made him one of the best of letter-writers, made him also one of the best of talkers. This talent he turned to good account, not in European diplomacy only but in German politics as well. Many questions that could not be settled by debates in parliament were adjusted over the beer and in the smoke of his famous parliamentary breakfasts in the Wilhelmstrasse.

Speeches

He was not commonly regarded by the Germans as a good parliamentary speaker. In England he would have been regarded as one of the best. The German taste in public speaking inclines to the oratorical; Bismarck's manner was usually conversational. The substance and the arrangement of his speeches were excellent. They were always adapted rather to convince his hearers than to excite their admiration. They contained, nevertheless, more quotable sayings and have enriched the speech of Germany with more quotations, not, perhaps, than the writings of her great poets but certainly than the spoken words of any German since Luther.

Writings

His writings have not only the excellence often observed in men of action — the simplicity, directness and vigor of a Wellington or a Grant — they have in high degree a distinctively literary quality and charm. The vague word is avoided, and the precise, unique word is found; the current phrase, that has lost its edges by wear, is replaced by a phrase fresh-

minted and clean-cut; there is the unexpected turn that is wit without the obvious intention, and the literary suggestion that is not quotation; there is everywhere the perception not only of the intellectual but also of the sensuous value of words—in sum, there is style. When Bismarck's letters were first published, the poet and novelist Heyse is said to have thanked God that that man had gone into politics, "because he would have spoiled our trade."

The qualities that distinguished Bismarck as a statesman were rapid and accurate perception of the central and decisive points in the most complicated situation; tenacity of purpose in following his chief end, combined with readiness to vary, with every change of circumstances, the mode of its pursuit; and a rare degree of moderation at the moment of fullest triumph. Of this last trait he gave striking evidence in the terms accorded to Austria and to the Prussian parliamentary opposition after the victories of 1866.

Qualities as a
statesman

Political
methods

In the earlier stages especially of his public career, Bismarck showed himself a master of diplomatic strategy, but where finesse seemed needless he often employed methods that savored of brutality. It should, however, be remembered that the belated political development of Germany forced upon him, in an age that is humane to the verge of sentimentalism, the rough work which William the Conqueror did for England in the eleventh century and Richelieu for France in the seventeenth. One great merit of his diplomacy was its general truthfulness; nor is this merit lessened by the fact that, because of the persistence of an opposite tradition, Bismarck's frankness was often more deceptive than another man's lies.

Family

Bismarck was married in 1847 to Johanna von Puttkammer, to whose constant sympathy, unwavering confidence and watchful care the prince declared himself largely indebted for his successes. Of this union three children were born

— Marie (1848), married in 1878 to Count Cuno Rantzau; Herbert (1849), married in 1892 to Marguerite, Countess Hoyos; and William (1852), married in 1885 to Sibylla von Arnim. Both sons held important governmental positions. Count Herbert became in 1886 foreign secretary in the imperial chancellery, and in 1888 a member of the Prussian cabinet. When his father was dismissed he resigned these offices, but he afterward sat as a Conservative in the Imperial Diet. Count William was appointed in 1889 president of the district of Hanover, and in 1895 he became governor (*Oberpräsident*) of the province of East Prussia.

The literature dealing directly or chiefly with the life and achievements of Prince Bismarck is already very extensive. His speeches have been published in several German editions — the best is Kohl's, in twelve volumes — and in a French edition of fifteen volumes. Many of his diplomatic and other state papers have been

Bismarck
literature
to 1898

published by Poschinger — *Preussen im Bundestage*, four volumes; *Dokumente zur Geschichte der Wirthschaftspolitik*, five volumes — and by Hahn and Wippermann in *Fürst Bismarck*, five volumes. Four volumes of Bismarck's political letters and four small volumes of his private letters have also been printed. In his retirement the prince prepared memoirs to be published at the discretion of his successor. In Busch — *Bismarck und seine Leute, Neue Tagebuchblätter, Unser Reichs-Kanzler, Bismarck und sein Werk* — the prince found a Boswell who kept a diary and who reports much of the great man's small-talk. Bismarck's Frankfurt despatches and his letters have been translated into French; some of his letters have also appeared in English. Busch's material has recently been collected and published in English in two large volumes: *Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of his History* (1898).

The best account of Bismarck's public career down to 1870 is that given by

Sybel in his *Begründung des deutschen Reichs*, seven volumes, of which there is an English translation. Sybel's history is based, except as regards the years 1867-70, upon the Prussian archives; and until these and other European archives are thrown open to students, it will remain the most authoritative source of information. The fullest study of Bismarck's policy after 1870 is given by Blum in his *Deutsches Reich zur Zeit Bismarcks*—a book largely inspired by the prince himself. Blum has also published an elaborate history in six volumes, covering Bismarck's entire career: *Bismarck und seine Zeit*. Numerous other biographies of Bismarck have been written by his countrymen; those by Hesekiel, Müller and Jahnke seem to be the most popular. The best French book is that by Edouard Simon; the fullest English life is Charles Lowe's *Prince Bismarck*, two volumes, 1886. Mr. Lowe has since published a more condensed biography in one volume.

Those who are curious to follow the changing appreciations of Bismarck as revealed in caricatures will find collected in one volume — *Bismarck-Album des Kladderadatsch* — all the Bismarck pictures published by the leading humorous paper of Berlin, from the first appearance of the Prussian deputy in 1847 to the dismissal of the German chancellor in 1890; and in Grand-Carteret, *Bismarck en Caricatures* (Paris, 1890), they will find reproductions of one hundred and forty cartoons from comic papers in all parts of the world.

In his little *Bismarck-Gedenkbuch* (1888) Kohl gives a fairly full Bismarck bibliography, and also a list of original paintings, sketches and photographs of the prince. A relatively complete bibliography by Schultze and Koller — *Bismarck-Literatur*, Leipsic, 1895 — contains about six hundred titles. Lemcke and Buechner of New York publish a useful list of selected books and pamphlets.

Since 1893 a *Bismarck-Jahrbuch* has

appeared, edited by Kohl and devoted exclusively to the study of Bismarck's life and achievements.

Modern German and European histories; German political pamphlets from 1862 to the present time; memoirs and biographies of the German statesmen and generals who were associated with Bismarck's work and of the foreigners who were his allies or his enemies—all these necessarily deal to a greater or less extent with Bismarck's career and constitute a sort of secondary Bismarck literature. Among the works of the last-mentioned class—biographies—Erich Marcks's *Kaiser Wilhelm I* deserves special mention, not only because its author has much to say about Bismarck, but also because of the fairness and insight that he displays.

Shortly after the original publication of the foregoing pages, in 1898, Prince Herbert Bismarck gave to the press two volumes of his father's memoirs: *Gedanken und Erinnerungen von Otto Fürst von Bismarck*. Almost simultaneously

Additional
literature,
1898-1910

appeared an authorized English translation, entitled: *Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman*. The book is in no proper sense either an autobiography or a history. Its character is accurately expressed in its German title: it consists of reflections upon Prussian, German and European politics and of personal reminiscences. There can be no doubt that it was written for the purpose of impressing upon the German people Bismarck's views of German policy. It is his political testament; and as such it will assuredly be cited for many years to come, not alone because of the weight which Bismarck's name lends to his counsels, but because of their wisdom.

The reminiscences, which form a large part of the book, add little to our knowledge of the historical events in which Bismarck figured, or even to our knowledge of his view of those events; for Sybel, Blum and other inspired chroniclers have given us fuller narratives which reflect with substantial accuracy the Bismarckian

view. Certain important matters on which historical students have desired more light — particularly the Spanish candidacy — are left in the “darkness visible” of the contemporaneous official explanation. Nor does the book add to our knowledge or change our impression of the writer’s personality. About himself, his sentiments and his ideas, Bismarck was always surprisingly communicative, even in his writings and public speeches; in private conversation he was often amazingly indiscreet; and he not only tolerated but encouraged the recording for publication of his least guarded utterances. He sometimes told Busch that this or the other remark would make a bad impression; but he also said that when he was dead Busch might print what he pleased. To such self-revelations these memoirs, written in Bismarck’s public manner, of course add nothing of importance.

The reminiscences give us, however, more accurately than any preceding publication, Bismarck’s view of some of his most

prominent contemporaries. It contains a number of remarkable historical portraits. The old emperor and Augusta, Frederick III and Victoria, Prince Gortchakoff and other diplomatists become in Bismarck's pages very real and very human. Of William II nothing is said: the published volumes close with the reign of Frederick.

In 1901 Prince Herbert Bismarck published a much fuller collection than had previously appeared of his father's letters to his mother. Of this book also an authorized English version, somewhat abridged, was published in the same year, under the title: *The Love Letters of Prince Bismarck*. These letters reveal, naturally enough, the kindlier and gentler side of Bismarck's nature; but even here his comments on persons and events are often as trenchant and caustic as in his recorded table-talk.

Of the numerous contemporary memoirs which have appeared since 1898 and which deal with the politics of the Bismarckian era, perhaps the most important are those

of Prince Hohenlohe, published in German and in English in 1906. In the matter of Bismarck's dismissal, they place the conduct of William II in a favorable light. Much more of Bismarck himself, however, is given in the second volume (1909) of the memoirs of Christoph von Tiedemann, who was chief of the imperial chancellery from 1876 to 1881.

Among the more recent biographies of Bismarck, three deserve mention. Charles Andler's *Le Prince de Bismarck* (1899) is a critical study of the statesman; Paul Matter's *Bismarck et son temps* (three volumes, 1905-1908) gives a detailed history of the period. Both writers show thorough acquaintance with the sources and with German conditions; both write with creditable control of their national bias. Of the numerous German biographies, that by Erich Marcks, of which the first volume — *Bismarck's Jugend: 1815-1848* — was published in 1909, promises to be the most authoritative.

BISMARCK AS A PHRASE-MAKER

THE epithet here attached to Bismarck is one that he would not have liked. For phrases, in the sense in which he commonly used the word, and for the makers of phrases he had the greatest contempt. For the illustrious von Gagern, the figure-head of the unpractical unity movement of 1848-1850, who exasperated the Prussian deputy by addressing him in private conversation "as if I (Bismarck) were a mass-meeting," his victim could find no worse name than "phrase-sprinkler," or, as Mr. Lowe renders it, "phrase watering-pot"; nor could Bismarck, the prime minister, invent any more derisive description for the Prussian Chamber of Deputies, when in the early sixties it was giving him the greatest annoyance, than "house of phrases." His dislike of Eugene Richter

was based in part on Richter's *doctrinaire* politics, but it was due chiefly to the fact that this deputy was one of the most indefatigable orators in German public life, possessing what Bismarck described as "the dangerous gift of eloquence." When Bismarck was in a fair state of health he could deal with Richter lightly. "I have neither time nor strength," he once said,

to follow the speech of Deputy Richter through all its arguments. I share with you very often the pleasure of listening to a sample of his eloquence ; and on such occasions I have precisely the same sensation as at a performance of *The Maid of Orleans*, where one is at first surprised by the endless triumphal procession, until, at the third march past, one remarks : "Good Lord ! it is always the same people who are crossing the stage again in the same costumes !"

In his periods of illness and nervous exhaustion, Bismarck found Richter intolerable, and was wont to take refuge in a ministerial anteroom as often as the deputy ascended the tribune — a practice which called forth one of *Kladderadatsch's* cleverest cartoons. Bismarck and Richter

were drawn as the moving figures in the meteorological toy familiar to all Germans—the little “weather house” with two doors, in which “fair weather” conceals himself as often as “storm” emerges.

“Were I unable,” said Bismarck, in 1882,

to get on with a parliament, I should have had to leave my post long ago. With a parliament that had a majority of Richters, to be sure, I could not govern; with such a parliament nobody could govern.

Sixteen years earlier Bismarck had informed the Prussian deputies, in the vein of Mark Antony and with scarcely greater veracity:

I am no orator. I am not able, by juggling with words, to work upon your feelings and obscure facts. My speech is simple and clear.

There are, however, many kinds of phrases, and the sort Bismarck had chiefly in mind when he denounced phrase-makers was the abstract sort. For generalizations Bismarck, like other men of action, had little use; “I sell theories,” he said, “extraordinarily cheap”; and for

those political abstractions that have become the counters of modern political reasoning he had slight respect. A few citations will show how far his disrespect was carried:

"Freedom" is really used to designate rule. By "freedom of speech" is meant the rule of speakers; by "freedom of the press" is meant the predominant and preponderant influence of newspaper editors. Indeed, gentlemen — and I am not speaking as a secretary — it happens often that "freedom of the church" is taken as meaning the rule of the priests.

By "the people" every one means what suits his purpose — ordinarily a random collection of individuals whom he has succeeded in winning over to his own views.

We are all of us "the people," and not solely the gentlemen who represent certain ancient claims and traditions termed "liberal." . . . I am one of the people. His majesty the emperor is one of the people.

If you expect to frighten me with the word "socialistic," I can only say that I have long ceased to be afraid of bogies.

In one of his earliest speeches he declared that French "equality" was "the daughter of envy and greed" — an excel-

lent illustration, by the way, of his adroitness in fighting a phrase with a phrase. At times it was his practice simply to turn a phrase or epithet, like a captured gun, upon its earlier possessors, leaving his hearers to judge whether he had not an equal right to use it. Thus he described some of the politicians of the opposition as "courtiers of the majority," and accused them of "Byzantinian servility to the populace." Here, however, we are out of the class of phrases we are now considering — the abstract phrases. For these his dislike was so great that he was not willing that they should be used on his own side. Thus he objected to the term "culture conflict" (*Culturkampf*), declaring that in his struggle with the Roman hierarchy he was not fighting for "culture," but for the political interests of Prussia and of the empire.

Words and things are so commonly confounded that it is perhaps needful to say that Bismarck's attitude toward such terms as "the people" and "culture" — or rather

his attitude toward what he regarded as the abuse of these terms—implied no failure to appreciate the thing behind the word. It should also be noted that his love of the concrete and his dislike for the abstract were not at all equivalent to materialism and the rejection of ideals. It was Bismarck who, in one of his most remarkable speeches, alluded to “the imponderables that weigh heavier than all material weights.”

In one of his letters from Frankfort, in which he discussed the possibility of a European coalition against Germany and endeavored to forecast the probable conduct of the smaller German states, Bismarck wrote:

They will hardly feel called upon to sacrifice their existence to an idealistic loyalty to the German confederation, but will at once consider themselves bound to secure above all things the maintenance in each country of its hereditary dynasty; and the several governments, in their paternal wisdom, will decide when the precise moment has come at which anxiety for the welfare of their subjects renders desertion to the enemy a painful but unavoidable duty.

This passage is notable because the phrases that here are made to ring so hollow were the Conservative shibboleths of the day. It is notable from another point of view, because it exhibits an intensity of scorn combined with a quietness of utterance which reminds one, and not for the first or only time in reading Bismarck, of the *saeva indignatio* of the great Irish dean.

Another class of phrases that Bismarck disliked was the grandiloquent. "I hate big words," he said; and he met them, as he met abstractions, by inquiring what was behind them. When, in 1863, the English ambassador menaced Prussia with the wrath of Europe, Bismarck quietly asked: "Who is Europe?"

It must be admitted, however, that he occasionally used big words himself. "An appeal to fear finds no echo in German hearts" and "We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world" can hardly be put in any other class; and there are on record a few phrases about himself that

sound rather big to English ears. "It is the same to me whether I die for my king on the pavement of the street or on the battlefield," he said in 1866; but this was just after his hand-to-hand struggle with the assassin Cohen, and not very long before Sadowa.

That outbursts of this sort were not really characteristic is shown not only by their infrequency, but by the fact that in his speeches almost every sentence of this character is followed by another of the driest and most prosaic sort, as if he regretted the momentary lapse into grandiloquence and was anxious to efface, if possible, the memory of the offence. One often cited and somewhat boastful passage is accompanied, in the full report, by a delicate bit of self-persiflage:

In my political life, which through changing phases of European politics has been devoted always to the resolute representation of the interests of my king and my country, I have had the honor of making many enemies. Go from the Garonne — *to begin with Gascony* — to the Vistula, from the Belt to the Tiber,

search at home along the courses of the Oder and the Rhine, and you will find, I am proud to assert, that at this moment I am the most and the best hated person in this country.

Bismarck's most characteristic and most successful phrases were direct and terse statements of fact or of opinion. They caught the public ear in part by their courage, which in some cases amounted to audacity, in part by their picturesqueness. They are remembered for their truth. Some of them have taken the rank of verified prophecies.

The most famous of them all dates from 1862 :

Not by speeches and resolutions of majorities are the great questions of the time decided—that was the mistake of 1848 and 1849—but by iron and blood.¹

¹ The speech in which this passage occurs was made in committee and was not officially reported. In the best newspaper reports it appeared in the form on which the above translation is based, and it appears in the same form in the collections of Bismarck's speeches. In some of the contemporary reports, however, the concluding words are given in the reverse order, "blood and iron" ; and this version, which is illogical, because it puts the effect before the cause, but which is perhaps smoother, became popular ; and in citing the phrase, in a speech delivered

Of the same date is the remark, which was made to the Austrian Count Karolyi, that "Austria should transfer its centre of gravity to Ofen." The frankness of this advice recalls a brief dialogue, which occurred a few years earlier, between Bismarck and a French diplomat. "This policy," said the Frenchman, "will bring you to Jena." "Why not to Waterloo?" Bismarck inquired. Since Olmütz Prussia had been so trodden down and crowed over, that these audacities made every Prussian who had heard them breathe more freely. They produced the effect of a declaration of independence.

The phrase "iron and blood" is a good illustration of Bismarck's habit of saying things which others knew but did not quite dare to say. An earlier example was his answer, in 1850, to the grand duke of Hesse, who complained that the Prussian ambassador Canitz had been

in 1886, Bismarck himself accepted the popular version. In the authorized French translation of his speeches, however, the phrase is given in both instances, 1862 and 1886, in the logical order: "*le fer et le sang.*"

asking "indiscreet questions." Bismarck responded: "As a rule, diplomats are paid to keep on asking questions until they get no more answers."

Truth and vigor of concrete illustration contributed to the success of Bismarck's statement, in 1876, that Germany's interests in Oriental affairs were not worth "the sound bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer." Equally exact, and embodying a truth which is still imperfectly appreciated, is his statement that "Russian nihilism is a climatic variation of radicalism (*Fortschritt*) rather than of socialism."

Of briefer phrases, "satisfied nations" is often attributed to Bismarck, but it was quoted from and credited to Metternich. "*Beati possidentes*" is doubtless older than Bismarck, but he made the words his own by the way in which he used them. "Conflict duties" or "fighting duties" (*Kampfzölle*) is Bismarck's, and the phrase holds its own as a pregnant and convenient description of economic policy. Less known but equally pregnant is the term "fighting

laws" (*Kampfgesetze*), which he applied to the Prussian laws directed against the Roman hierarchy. While these measures were in force, he described the statute-book as an "armory." When they were in process of abrogation he developed the metaphor, saying:

If we think that we are on the eve of war and lay in stores of melinite and other explosives, we are not apt to regard these as permanent household furniture.

The conflict with the church ended in a truce. "Peace between king and priest," Bismarck said, "will always be a squaring of the circle, approximated but never fully reached."

Of similes and metaphors Bismarck made very frequent use. Of his similes, two things may be said. He always acted in accordance with Yellowplush's advice to Bulwer-Lytton, that when you are employing a simile "it's as well to have it *like*." And having found the comparison that was "like," Bismarck inquired as little as Homer or Lincoln whether it was dignified or in accordance with the canons of a re-

finer literary taste. To a parliamentary demand that, while certain diplomatic negotiations were pending, the government should inform the deputies what would be its maximum concessions, Bismarck replied with a comparison as homely and as unanswerable as any of Lincoln's:

Any one who has ever bought or sold a horse will be loath, during such a deal, to tell a third person — possibly a very talkative third person — what is the most that he will pay or the least for which he will sell, for his minimum would at once become his maximum and his maximum the other party's minimum.

To an attack upon the military budget, he responded: "‘Unproductive’ in the same sense as the army are the dikes which protect the lowlands from inundation."

Bismarck used metaphors much more frequently than similes. Mixed metaphors occasionally occur in his speeches, but rarely, if ever, in his writings. When they are found, the intruding secondary metaphor is usually contained in a phrase so current that its figurative character is easily overlooked. His conscious meta-

phors are seldom of this well-worn sort and are often strikingly novel. They are sometimes couched in a single word; witness his remark that direct taxes rest upon the tax-payers "with a certain angular brutality."

Some of the best of his metaphors and similes date from the period of his activity in the old Diet at Frankfort. He put in two words the situation of the smaller states, which at that time maintained an artificial independence under the protection of the greater, by saying that they were "under glass." The character of the confederation and its probable end he indicated as follows:

With the Prussian horse hitched in front and the Austrian behind, the federal wagon must sooner or later go to pieces.

Prussia, he steadily maintained, had no interest in averting such a catastrophe.

A war waged by Prussia for the confederation would strongly remind me of that Englishman who fought a sentry for the sake of hanging himself in the sentry-box.

Were Austria to be attacked by Russia and France, Prussia, he insisted, should stand aloof; otherwise

we should probably be beaten and perhaps bleed tunelessly to death *pour les beaux yeux* of Austria and of the Diet.

"*Uns singend verbluten*" is a phrase of which Heine might well have been proud. Bismarck seldom permitted himself to become so nearly poetical — not even when, as in this instance, the intention was sarcastic. Equally out of his usual manner, and dangerously near eloquence, is a passage in one of his speeches, describing war as "the game of iron dice, in which the stakes are kings' and emperors' thrones."¹

During the Crimean war, Bismarck strongly supported the policy of Prussian neutrality, and when it was ended he was in favor of keeping aloof from the Congress of Paris. If Prussia went in, it was apparently necessary for it to accept a

¹ Both poetry and eloquence, however, are to be found in the Loki speech, cited below, p. 128.

programme framed by Austria, France and England. In a confidential letter to Minister Manteuffel, Bismarck cited a French friend who had said that there was "*trop d'inconnu*" in the programme, and went on:

While the authors of the programme are presumably in accord among themselves as to the meaning of this "unknown," it is certainly inadvisable to pay a visit to three suspicious characters in a dark house, with every turn and corner of which they are accurately acquainted.

Frederick William IV was unduly anxious to participate in the Congress; and Austria, knowing this, was demanding pledges and concessions as the price of admission. Bismarck writes in the same letter:

The greater and the more impatient desire to figure in the conferences we allow to be discerned, *the higher the stick will be held that we must leap over to get in*. The cooler we show ourselves, the more surely I count on our being brought in with honor and freedom.

This letter was shown to the king, as Bismarck doubtless meant it should be;

and the undeveloped but perfectly indicated metaphor which is here italicized was better calculated than pages of grave protest to make the king see the indignity of the part he was tempted to play.

In 1858 Bismarck pointed out that Austria's financial weakness increased its political influence. "The capitalists cleave to Austria as the physician cleaves to a paying patient."

When he became premier of Prussia, he told the military committee of the Diet, in the "iron and blood" speech, that Prussia was undoubtedly carrying "armor too heavy for its slim body"—a phrase that, like Motley's allusion to "Prussia's wasp-waist," becomes intelligible after a single glance at a map of the period. His conclusion, of course, was not that the armor should be lightened, but that the body should be made stouter.

After the victory of Sadowa, Bismarck had "the thankless task of pouring water into the foaming wine," that is, of convincing the king and the military party that

they had not conquered Europe and that they should give Austria easy terms for the sake of speedy peace. He had his troubles, too, with the first North German parliament in 1867, when the deputies were disposed to spend too much time in debating the provisions of the new constitution; and his famous exhortation: "Let us put Germany in the saddle: it will surely be able to ride," brought the assembly from the clouds to the solid earth and secured fairly prompt action. The saying may have been suggested by Charles Albert's "*L'Italia farà da sè*," but the form was Bismarck's own. When Baden, the only South German state in which, at the time, the German unity party was in the majority, asked, in the same year, for admission to the North German confederation, Bismarck pronounced it unwise "to skim the cream off the milk and let the rest turn sour."

During the European complications which followed the Russian-Turkish war, and which were afterwards adjusted at the

Congress of Berlin, Bismarck deemed it of the highest importance to indicate, in a way that could not be misunderstood, the attitude of Germany. He said:

In mediating peace, I do not conceive that . . . we are to play the arbiter and say: "So it shall be, and behind this stands the power of the German Empire" ; on the contrary, I think of our part as more modest . . . rather as that of an honest broker, who really wishes to bring the trade to a conclusion.

Tiedemann tells us that the prince searched for a couple of days before he found the "honest broker" phrase, working out and discarding in the meantime several less simple comparisons.

Less known but quotable is the phrase: "The clean linen of a civilized nation."

Discussing the insecurity of peaceful conditions in the modern world, Bismarck said:

Every country is held at some time to account for the windows broken by its press ; the bill is presented, some day or other, in the shape of hostile sentiment in the other country.

And again :

The political relations between two great states may be compared to the position of two travellers in a lonely forest who do not know each other and neither of whom quite trusts the other. If the one puts his hand in his pocket, the other cocks his revolver, and if he hears the first one's hammer click, he at once fires.

To describe a situation is not to justify it; and on another occasion Bismarck said that to wage an offensive war in order to anticipate a possible attack was, "in a sense, suicide in apprehension of death."

Bismarck did not enjoy seeing statues of himself: "It disturbs me," he said, "to stand beside myself as a sort of fossil." When he left Berlin after his dismissal he received a great popular ovation. "The Berliners," he said, "gave me a first-class funeral." And later, in his retirement at Friedrichsruh:

Passions are like the trout in my pond: one devours the other until but one fat old trout is left. In my case the passion for politics has in the course of time devoured all the rest.

Figures of speech, like other phrases, can be turned against their makers; and

one phrase which Bismarck launched in parliament was promptly captured by the Radicals and has since sailed under their flag. In justifying the application of the income of the sequestered Hanoverian crown property to secret police purposes, he said in 1869:

I was not born to be a spy; the part is foreign to my whole nature; but I believe that we deserve your thanks if we subject ourselves to the task of following noxious reptiles into their holes to observe what they are doing.

This remark not only resulted in the Guelf property being commonly described as the "reptile-fund," but it has made "reptile" a current term to describe, not a conspirator, but a secret agent of the government.

That Bismarck possessed both wit and humor has been abundantly shown by the sayings already cited. Some of his phrases, however, owe their popularity so entirely to one or the other of these qualities that they deserve separate notice. The best of them, perhaps, is his reply to

the German prince who had received the offer of a crown in the Balkan peninsula, and who asked him whether he would advise its acceptance. "By all means," said the chancellor, "it will be a delightful recollection." The popular instinct, which seldom errs in such things, has assigned the rôle of questioner in this anecdote to Alexander of Battenberg, sometime prince of Bulgaria, and has thus given to Bismarck's jest the value of a prophecy. The historian Sybel, however, has been unkind enough to tell us that the prince in question was Charles of Hohenzollern and the crown that of Roumania.

If "wit is but wisdom to advantage dressed," place may be given here to a sentence from one of Bismarck's Frankfurt letters. Baron Reitzenstein, who had been the Prussian member of the federal military commission, had regularly failed to secure such action as the Prussian government desired and had been recalled. Bismarck explained that the superior technical training possessed by this officer

had antagonized the other members of the commission; and he suggested that the baron's successor should

unite with the other requirements for his post . . . the capacity of making tolerant and conciliatory use of his superior knowledge.

When Bismarck was dismissed and General Caprivi appointed to succeed him, William II made Bismarck a field marshal. "The emperor," said Bismarck, "has arranged a *chassez-croisez*: he has made his best general chancellor and his chancellor a general." Bismarck was also created duke of Lauenburg. "That," he said, "will be convenient if I wish to travel *incognito*."

Bismarck's humor was often grim. When, in 1871, the French plenipotentiaries protested against the size of the contribution which he proposed to exact from Paris, "Paris," Bismarck replied, "is a great city; let us not show it any lack of respect." Slightly grim, again, was his defence of "the coupon-cutters" against a socialistic attack. He pronounced them

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an estimable class of citizens, and one that the government may well desire to see greatly increased in numbers, because they combine wealth with a certain timidity.

In lighter vein was his explanation to parliament, in 1878, touching his reasons for dissolving it and ordering new elections. He had done this, he said, that the deputies might discuss the situation with their constituents "and return strengthened, like Antæus, by contact with their domestic earth." At another time, in pleading for a cessation of reforms and a season of recuperation, he said:

Let us leave our children a problem or two: they might find the world very tiresome if there were nothing left for them to do.

Of a subtler and more imaginative type is the humor of another passage:

In my position as minister-president in Prussia and chancellor in the empire I am perhaps rather the point on which the expression of discontent is focused; and I may say that whenever I find myself in any private situation, in a railway carriage, a social gathering or the like, I note in many people the sort of satis-

faction which a discontented farmer would feel if he had before him the weather personified.

Bismarck's comparisons and illustrations were drawn more often from life than from his library, and comparatively few of his best phrases were suggested by books. In his writings, his speeches, and his table-talk there is, however, an abundance of literary and historical allusions. He drew occasionally on mythology, classical and German; and in speeches delivered on March 2 and 13, 1885, he gave to the Baldur myth a political interpretation that will long be remembered :

A peculiar prophetic foresight lies in our old German myth. As often as it fares well with the Germans, as often as a German national springtime opens, our Loki is at hand, and always finds his Hödur — a dull half-witted fellow whom he adroitly instigates to kill the German people's spring. . . . Partisan dissension grows rampant ; and if this partisan spirit appeals with its Loki-voice to Hödur, the elector, . . . to strike his fatherland dead, then it is this Loki whom I arraign before God and before history. . . .

While Bismarck often cited or paraphrased German writers, his writings and

speeches show that none of these had exerted upon him so strong an influence as Shakespeare. It is clear that he had read and reread many of the plays, both in the original and in translation. Apart from direct quotations, which are frequent, there are in his speeches numerous reminiscences of Shakespearian phrases. "I believe," he said, "that I serve God in serving my king"; and he once censured "the sickly pallor of mistrust" of the government which he noted on the faces of the deputies. If this last illustration seems doubtful, compare Shakespeare's phrase in the German version, "*des Gedankens Blässe angekränkelt*," with Bismarck's "*krankte Blässe des Mistrauens*." No such comparison is needed to show that Bismarck had a Shakespearian passage in mind when he prophesied the advent of politicians who would "out-richter Richter."

In literature as in life Bismarck took whatever suited his purpose; and two of his best literary illustrations are drawn from German operas. In 1856 he wrote

that Austria "will play Don Juan with all the cabinets if it can misuse so sturdy a Leporello as Prussia"; and in 1849 he made a striking comparison between the bargain which the German democracy wished to drive with Frederick William IV and the pact between the devil and the huntsman in *Der Freischütz*:

It will not be long before the radicals come to the new emperor with the imperial arms and ask him: "Do you think this eagle was given you for nothing?"

Of history few statesmen, even in Germany, have a knowledge so broad and so minute as was Bismarck's. Of this knowledge he made effective use in debate; but the list of Bismarckian phrases based on history is a short one. "Catilinarian existences" is still cited, and also the statement that the annual voting of the army bill would turn the royal army into "a parliamentary army"; but the only really famous phrase of historical origin is the sentence launched during the conflict with the Roman Catholic church: "We are not on the road to Canossa" —

“*Nach Canossa gehen wir nicht.*” Of this war-cry *Kladderadatsch* afterwards suggested a revised version: “*Nach Canossa gehen wir doch.*” The Germans, however, have not yet forgotten Bismarck’s sharp reply to an Ultramontane deputy:

The pope is not to me the successor of Peter in the sense indicated by Count Brühl. Peter was not infallible.

Bismarck’s power of condensed statement gave to many of his phrases the form of the aphorism and to some that of the proverb. Several of the sayings already quoted might be cited again, by way of illustration; but the following will suffice:

The dread of responsibility is a disease of our time.

The world cannot be ruled from below.

A great state cannot be governed according to party views.

The majority has no heart.

Any one who can make promises can get himself elected.

The more constitutional, the more expensive.

A chamber is more easily mobilized than an army.

In negotiating with Austria, every concession is the mother of a new demand.

Concessions and gifts are dishes that whet the appetite without satisfying it.

Liberated peoples are not grateful but exacting.

The German has a strong leaning towards discontent.

We cannot hasten the course of time by setting our clocks forward.

You cannot ripen fruit by setting lamps under the tree.

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Bismarck and German unity

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